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"[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance for
all individuals ....[It is] the most important relation in
life ......
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Griswold v. Connecticut

(1978)1
"[Elite South Carolinian] siblings . . .frequently had

more in common... and their connections lasted longer
than their ties to parents or spouses."
Lorri Glover, All Our Relations: Blood Ties and Emotional Bonds among the Early South Carolina Gentry

(2000)2
"The primary bond in the Navajo kinship system is the
mother-child bond . ..."

3
Gary Witherspoon, Navajo Kinship & Marriage (1975)

"California law, like nature itself, makes no provision
for dual fatherhood . ..."

4
Justice Antonin Scalia, Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989)

"From the point of view of the children, there may be a
number of women who act as 'mothers' toward them."
Carol B. Stack, All Our Kin: Strategiesfor Survival in a
5
Black Community (1974)
I. INTRODUCTION: KINSHIP, KINSHIP CHANGE, AND THE
PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF LAW AS DESCRIPTIVE,
PRESCRIPTIVE OR EXPRESSIVE
Kinship is defined as "a system of rights and responsibilities between particular categories of people,"'6 and refers not only to biological
l 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S. Ct. 673, 679-80 (1979) (Marshall, J.).
2 LORRI GLOVER, ALL OUR RELATIONS: BLOOD TIES AND EMOTIONAL BONDS AMONG
THE EARLY SOUTH CAROLINA GENTRY X (2000).
3 GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE

21 (1975).

4 491 U.S. 110, 118 & n.3, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 & n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
5 CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY
63 (1974).
6 Anita Ilta Garey & Karen V. Hansen, INTRODUCTION TO FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC POLITICS at xviii (Karen V. Hansen & Anita Ilta Garey, eds. 1998). See
also ROBERT PARKIN, KINSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC CONCEPTS (1997) (describing the
concept of kinship). As discussed further herein, see infra at Part III, kinship studies in the
field of anthropology experienced several periods of waxing and waning. During the
1960s-1980s, Levi-Strauss and others dominated the field, followed in late 1980's and early
1990's by cultural anthropologists, particularly feminist cultural anthropologists whose deconstruction of kinship notions exposed them as primarily culturally contingent, gendered, and
ultimately phenomenologically non-existent. See id. at ix. As a result of this critique, some
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or legal connections between people but also to "particular positions in a
network of relationships."'7 In a number of its decisions defining the
scope of Constitutional protection for adult-child or intimate adult human
relationships-the category of kin at issue in this Article, 8 the United
States Supreme Court relies upon historical traditions and norms in defining the parameters of Constitutional protection of current practices
and relations. 9 In doing so, the Court often fails to account for the true
anthropologists came to view kinship as no longer a viable area of study. Personal communication with anthropologist Sascha Goluboff, October 12, 1999. However, during the last decade of the 20th century, kinship studies underwent a revival, see PARKIN at ix-x. Kinship
studies revived, perhaps in part, as a result of the deconstruction itself but also due to the
related Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered movement for recognition of alternative family
structures. See generally THE ETHICS OF KINSHIP: ETHNOGRAPHIC INQUIRIES (2001) (James D.
Faubion, ed.); PARKIN, supra, at ix-x; see also KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE (1991).
In addition, the advent of new procreative technologies challenged embedded cultural notions
of what is a "true" or "real" family. See generally JEANETrE EDWARDS ET AL., TECHNOLOGIES
OF PROCREATION: KINSHIP IN THE AGE OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION (2d ed. 1999).
7 See Garey & Hansen, supra note 6.
8 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (1965) (right to contraception based on sanctity of marital relationship); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry is a basic
civil right); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental),
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (unmarried father's interest in parental relationship requires procedural due process); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (biological link between child and unmarried father must be accompanied by a full commitment to
parental responsibilities to receive Constitutional protection), Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (sanctity of marital relationship overrides unmarried father's interest in
parenting his biological child with married woman). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164
(1973) (abortion included in the individual's liberty interests); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 443 (1972) (holding the right to determine whether or not to bear or beget a child is right
of an individual, and extending right to unmarried persons). Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 190-91 (1986) (no Constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy) with Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483, 2484 (2003) (overruling Bowers and finding substantive due
process protection).
9 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (relying on
history to demonstrate that the right to engage in sodomy is not deeply rooted in American
tradition and therefore is not a constitutionally protected right); Michael H., 491 U.S. at I I1
(discussing the protection of the marital family as a fundamental right and focusing on tradition, common-law and modem statutes and case law to support its view that marriage is a
fundamental right); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1997) (holding "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
(stating "[the Court's] jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children"). But cf. Loving, 388
U.S. at 7-8 (rejecting Virginia's historical practice of "preserv[ing] racial integrity" and
preventing the development of "a mongrel breed of citizens"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
629-30 (1996) (refusing to uphold an amendment to the Colorado state constitution which
allowed discrimination based on sexual orientation): Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (overruling Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, and holding that sodomy laws violate liberty interests when
applied to consensual private sexual behavior between same-sex adults and rejecting historical
practices in reaching its decision striking down anti-miscegenation laws and anti-gay statutes).
In contexts other than the family, the Court has also referred to historical practices to define
the scope of a particular Constitutional right or protection, sometimes in connection with substantive due process analysis, and at other times not. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
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richness of Americans' historical and present-day family-related kinship
practices and beliefs, as sociologists, historians, and cultural anthropologists carefully and fully expose them to be.' 0
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-83 (1990) (evaluating history to determine whether there
exists a Constitutional liberty interest in the right to die); International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992) (evaluating historical use of airports
and other transportation terminals as public fora to determine scope of free speech right);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (evaluating history to determine whether
there is substantive due process protection for assisted suicide); Chauffers, Teamsters, et al. v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-67 (1996) (analyzing history to determine scope of Constitutional
right to a jury in a civil case).
There is of course a large body of scholarship talking about the Supreme Court's fundamental
rights and substantive due process jurisprudence. See, e.g., John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 501-04 (1997) (critiquing substantive due process as not textually supported by the Constitution); see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85; Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
As a subset of this scholarship, there is also a body of traditional Constitutional law scholarship analyzing, critiquing, and arguing in support of the Supreme Court's use of history in
crafting the scope of fundamental fights. See, e.g., Veronica C. Abreu, The Malleable Use of
History in Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence:How the "Deeply Rooted" Test Should Not
be a Barrier to Finding the Defense of MarriageAct UnconstitutionalUnder the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. REV. 177, 188-90 (2002) (arguing that the Court often
overlooks or selectively reads history and tradition to define fundamental rights); Erwin
Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court and the FirstAmendment, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 901, 912-19 (1993) (critiquing the Supreme Court's use of history to deny constitutional
protection of certain fights); see generally Lucian E. Dervan, Selective Conceptions of Federalism: The Selective Use of History in the Supreme Court's States' Rights Opinions, 50 EMORY
L.J. 1295 (2001) (discussing the justices' selective use of history, specifically in last two decades); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631
(1999) (critiquing the Court's historical research in Bowers); see also Anna Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinantsof
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A
Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997) (outlining
the court's long-standing tradition of selectively reading history in order to produce the desired
result); John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964) (focusing on the use of history to determine original intent).
However, little attention has been paid by legal scholars or the courts to cultural anthropologists' contrary findings about Americans' views of kinship as they relate to the Supreme
Court's defining of family structure that are discussed in this Article.
10 See generally Garey & Hansen, supra note 6, at xix-xii ("The family is not universal;
nor is it unchanging. The family must be culturally situated and placed with a historical moment. All societies and cultures have webs of kinship relationships, and the design of these
webs changes over time and differs across cultures. And even if, looking backward in time,
we see dimensions of eighteenth-century family life that seem familiar, we cannot assume that
those features held the same meaning in 1776 as they do at the turn of the twenty-first century .... Families and kinship networks exist in a historical and social context; that is, they
exist in a constant state of flux."). See also infra at Part III (discussing some of the anthropological studies of American kinship practices).
While the question of whether the Court or the Congress is better equipped to interrogate these
kinds of studies is beyond the scope of this Article, it is the case that Congress sometimes does
no better than the Court, relying upon historical, in some ways 'invented' or at least overgeneralized, norms of kinship relationships when determining which relationships receive benefits
and protections. For example, the United States Census and the Family and Medical Leave
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For the Court, there is of course a doctrinal demand for looking to
history when defining which family-related rights and structures fall
within substantive due process protection; although the incorporation debate unlocked the door, I I Justice Harlan's Poe v. Ullman dissent and its
progeny fully opened the door, previously simply left ajar.1 2 This Article
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000), embody narrow definitions of family that exclude a number of cultural groups' kinship arrangements. See discussion of the United States
Census, infra at n.318 and 339, and the family definition in the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, infra at n.315 and 339. On the notion of the invention of history and historical traditions, see THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds.) (1983). In
the Hobsbawm vein, the Ozzie and Harriet nuclear family model is invented rather than actual,
and idea which is explored further in Part II in the discussion of historical studies of Southern,
landed, slave-holding gentry. Accord STEPHANIE CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE:
AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP

(1992);

STEPHANIE COON'TZ, THE WAY WE

REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA'S CHANGING FAMILIES

(1997). For example,

the United States Census and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
1I See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). These earlier incorporation cases first address the role of tradition in interpreting
the scope of individual rights protections in the Constitution. The ideological debates between
Justices Black and Frankfurter on the incorporation process turn on similar methodological
questions. See, e.g., Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
12 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (speaking of the
balance struck between "respect for the liberty of the individual... and the demands of organized society" as determining the scope of substantive due process protection, Harlan states:
"The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke."). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (citing this same
section of Harlan's Poe dissent in striking down a housing ordinance's limited definition of a
family); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
(noting that the Court in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), adopted Harlan's Poe language,
despite the fact that the majority in that case had not addressed that issue in Poe). Prior to Poe,
the issue of the scope of the 14th Amendment was wrapped up in the incorporation debate
more generally. For a discussion of the incorporation debate, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193 (1992).
This doctrinal call for historical analysis in determining the scope of substantive due process
protection is related to, but different in both purpose and method, from the historical analysis
demanded in original intent analysis (including original intent analysis of whether the Constitution demands substantive due process protection in the first place). See, e.g., Poe, 357 U.S.
at 539-45. Justice Harlan's discussion in of whether the Fourteenth Amendment includes
substantive due process protection occurs in his analysis of whether there is particular substantive due process protection for married couples' use of contraception. Id. at 545-49. For a
discussion of historical analysis to determine original intent, see Wofford, supra note 9. In
analyzing original intent, the purpose is to determine the meaning the Framers intended as to a
particular word or clause in the Constitution. The process of intention-analysis thus looks to
sources directly tied to the drafting of the Constitution itself, such as The FederalistPapers, to
determine the original meaning. For a competing argument that resorting to history to determine original intent should be merely one tool in determining the meaning of the Constitution,
see Wofford, supra note 9, at 503-04. Cf Seth Barrett Tillman, The FederalistPapers as
Reliable Historic Source Materialfor ConstitutionalInterpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 601,
617-18 (2003) (arguing that the Federalist papers provide weak evidence of the Framers'
intent with respect to anything but the broadest of questions about Constitutional structures
and their purposes). By contrast, in substantive due process analysis, the purpose of looking to
history is to determine which practices are so regularly engaged in by the general public,
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suggests that when the Court analyzes substantive due process protection
by determining which liberty interests are "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"' 13 it needs to
engage a thicker-to use Toni Massaro's term 14-descriptive account of
historical kinship practices and Americans' views of what is fundamental
in relation to family makeup. That is, although there may be such a
doctrinal demand for resort to history, analysis of that history should engage not just external, formal, structural relationships (typically synonymous with legal definitions, in a neatly circular and "mutually
reinforcing" fashion) 15 but also both to less formal kinship relationships,
without incurring legal prohibitions or punishments, as to constitute established traditions deserving of protection under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. Justice Scalia insists that the measure of protected traditions is
whether there are statutes that purport to protect those traditions. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at
122, n.2, and 127-28, n.6 (1989). In dissent, Justice Brennan insisted that there need not be
statutory provisions in order for something to constitute a protected tradition. Id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to an interest "traditionally protected by our society . . . rather
than one that society traditionally has thought important (with or without protecting it) .... ").
This Article rejects Justice Scalia's approach and favors Justice Brennan's. A majority of the
Court also has subsequently rejected Justice Scalia's approach in Footnote 6 of Michael H., in
which he proposed that the appropriate point for measuring whether there was substantive due
process protection for a particular interest was at the moment of ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("It is also tempting ... to suppose that the
Due Process Clause protects only those practices. . .that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.... But such
a view would be inconsistent with our law.").
In contrast with original intent analysis, the process of determining tradition for substantive
due process purposes does not necessarily require looking to particular historical political actors or documents but, rather, opens up a much wider array of resources for analysis. It may
be the case, however, that the narrow focus of much of the Court's family-related decisions are
tied to the ostensible practices of those of the Framers' ilk (meaning white, landed, educated,
Anglo-Saxon men) is simply a carryover of the intentionalism process of analysis. See Adam
B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV.
101, 103 (2002) (discussing positionality of justices as straight, white, male, wealthy jurists as
affecting their perspective on tradition).
13 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)). See also E. Gary Spitko, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1339 (1990) (critiquing Justice Scalia's
narrow approach, in Footnote 6 of Michael H., to analyzing the relevant tradition).
14 Toni Massaro, Gay Rights: Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996).
15 David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless
Father, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 753, 810 (1999) (noting that legal definitions of family map onto
social definitions precisely because they both "purport to rest upon" the same thing: "widespread and longstanding practice and social attitudes concerning family organization.") In his
article, Professor Meyer makes a compelling argument for an expanded family structure for
children caught between sets of parents, one biological and one adoptive. Id. at 806-07. As to
this particular part of his argument, however, that social and legal definitions of family are in
accord, I would agree but only if the argument further takes into account the critique that I
suggest in this Article and that Professor Meyer notes briefly in his article, that this supposed
longstanding practice and attitude about families is not universally shared in all class and
cultural groups in the United States. Id. at 806. Professor Meyer's point is that "[t]he preference for the parent-child model of child rearing is expressed repeatedly and unmistakably in
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as well as the meanings attributed by the participants and their cultural
community to those formal and informal relationships both historically
and currently. '

6

In addition, however, resort to history to define the parameters of
protected present-day kinship practices should strike us as particularly
troubling when it yields results that are in direct contradiction with actual
current social norms or practices. That is, even if the Supreme Court's
resort to history is doctrinally sound and its actual analysis of historical
norms is accurate (something that this Article questions, and that the
Court in Lawrence noted with respect to same-sex intimacy),1 7 presentday Americans' views and practices of kinship relations are simply much
more fluid and complex than many of the Supreme Court's decisions
allow.' 8 Further, under current substantive due process doctrine, resort
to history to define fundamental rights warranting substantive due process protection will always yield this more general result: that historical
social norms will trump current social norms. Justice Brennan, in his
dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., noted a version of this problem:
[In] the plurality's world, [we may not] ...deny 'tradi-

tion' its full scope by pointing out that the rationale for
the conventional rule has changed over the
years .... [I]nstead, our task is simply to identify a rule
denying the asserted interest and not to ask whether the
basis for that rule-which is the true reflection of the
legal doctrine." Id. at 806-807. This is accurate. My critique is that this preference in law is
flawed from the outset, since it requires looking through too narrow a lens coupled with a
claim of universality for the image revealed.
Notably, one of Professor Meyer's sources for his comment about shared and longstanding
views of kinship is David Schneider's AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL AccouNr, discussed
at length below. See infra at Part I1. David Schneider himself, however, issued a caveat to
his own work tweive years later that his research was strictly limited to white, urban, middleclass families. DAVID SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 121 (1980). In

particular, Schneider notes that class differences affect notions of kinship, AMERICAN KINSHIP,
supra at 122, as does ethnicity. Id. As Schneider notes, Sylvia Yanagisako, also discussed
herein at Part III, has demonstrated that Japanese-American kinship structures differ from
those described in his own work, and Phyllis Chock has done likewise with Greek-Americans.
Id., and see discussion herein at notes 216 (Chock's work on Greek-Americans) and 225
(Yanagisako's work on Japanese Americans).
16 See Mark V. Fushnet, Folowing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 IARV. L. REV. 781, 797 (1983) (discussing the importance of
evaluating the meanings attached to beliefs and intentions and that these meanings necessarily
derive from the societal context in which those beliefs and intentions arose).
17 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9, at 631; Goldstein, supra note 9 at 1074-1075; see
also La'rerce, 123 S.Ct. at 2482-83); cf. Doug Rendleman, Remedies, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 535
(20C1) (discussing the Court's poor historical analysis in the context of remedies).
dissenting). Cf Moore,
18 See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
the nuclear marital
than
431 U.S. at 505-06 (stating that families include a broader notion
family).
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values undergirding it-has changed too often or too recently to call the rule embodying that rationale a
"tradition." ' 9
That is, not only are social norms by nature not fixed (particularly
those that arise in the context of human relationships, and even more
20
particularly, in a country comprised primarily of immigrant families),
21
these social norms further require group assent to exist and have force.
When statutory or court-defined legal rules intend to operate expressively, as is often true with family law statutes and cases, some scholars
suggest they can "influence the development of social norms," 22 whether
intentionally or unintentionally on the part of the legal actors. 23 Other
scholars however, most notably Nancy Dowd, cogently demonstrate that
in the area of family law, the cultural norms and practices surrounding
families demonstrate remarkable resistance to legal prescription or control. 24 Regardless of whether family-related laws are thought to operate
19 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In construing the Fourteenth
Amendment to offer shelter only to those interests specifically protected by historical practice,
moreover, the plurality ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists. We are
Even if we can
not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one ....
agree, therefore, that 'family' and 'parenthood' are part of the good life, it is absurd to assume
that we can agree on the content of those terms ....").
20 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). On the fluidity of kinship relations, see Garey & Hansen, supra note 6, at xx ("Families and kinship networks exist in a
historical and social context; that is, they exist in a constant state of flux."). On the impact of
immigration on kinship change, see discussion of the work of Sylvia Yanagisako, infra at Part
III. On the disconnect between family law and family in action, see Nancy Dowd, Law, Culture and Family: The Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 Chi-Kent L.

Rev. 785 (2003) (arguing that cultural norms about family resist the influence of law).
21 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(199!); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1901 (2000). See also THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE
GREEKS TO FREUD (1990) (detailing the history of how biological conceptions of sex are his-

torically and culturally contingent and are in fact located within a system of gender); Shaun
Nichols, On the Genology of Norms: A Case for the Role of Emotion in CulturalEvolution, 69
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

234 (2002) (discussing the role of emotion in the prevalence of cer-

tain norms). See Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
1880, 1883 (1991); Toni Massaro, The Meanings of Shame - Implicationfor Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 688 (1997) (discussing the necessity of group agreement for
norms to have teeth); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip and Blackmail, 144 U. PA.

L. REV. 2237, 2291 (1996) (discussing "conditions under which members of close-knit groups
can threaten to invoke certain norm sanctions, such as shame and reputational loss").
22 Meyer, Family Ties, supra note 15, at 805 (discussing expressive function and social

norms functions of law in the context of guardianship versus adoption). For other scholarship
on the expressive function of law, see generally Lessig, supra note 21; Cass Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
23 See Meyer, Family Ties, supra note 15, at 803-05 (discussing how the "expressive
dimension" is sometimes intended and sometimes is not); contrastDowd, supra note 20 (arguing that cultural norms about family resist the influence of law).
24 Dowd, Law, Culture and Family, supra note 20.
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descriptively, expressively or normatively, by insisting on cementing
present-day social norms in historical practice, under some of its current
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court creates legal mandates that insist we
behave as our ancestors (and for many present-day Americans, this will
25
be other people's ancestors), never to evolve.
As this Article demonstrates, tying these mandates to Western European laws-whether present or past-may well be significantly disconnected from and therefore problematic for regulation even of U.S.
families of Western European descent because immigration itself impacts
kinship change.2 6 To avoid this incongruous result, we must develop a
new way of analyzing the scope of fundamental rights concerning families. This Article suggests that such an approach should be both fluid
enough to account for cultural differences in kinship structures 27 and also
decoupled from historical practices no longer reflective of modem-day
beliefs and norms. 28 This Article suggests as one possible approach that
the Court consider decades of research by sociologists, historians and
cultural anthropologists on Americans' understanding and practice of
kinship relationships. 29 The studies of contemporary kinship structures
25 Justice Scalia, in Michael H., explicitly endorses this idea: "[The purpose of the Due
Process Clause] is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional
values ...." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122, n.2. Scalia also suggests in this footnote and its
accompanying text that the determination of what has traditionally been protected means, in
part, that there be some explicit protection for the interest, or at least not a prohibition on it.
Id. This narrow focus on existing legal protections has been critiqued for flying in the face of
the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment as a protection for minorities against majoritarian tyranny, not only by Justice Brennan, in dissent in Michael H., but also by other legal scholars.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Spitko, supra note
13, at 1352-59 (exploring this issue and analyzing the Court's rejection of majoritarian rule in
Loving); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1699
(1991); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085-98 (1990).
Justice Scalia actually goes further than simply saying analysis of current statutes should guide
the Court and states that analysis should be restricted to those statutes in effect at the time of
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 148, n.6. A majority of
the Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, directly rejected this idea. Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a related discussion concerning original
intent analysis binding the present to the past, see, e.g. Wofford, supra note 9 at 502-03
(1964).
26 See discussion of Yanagisako's study of kinship change between first and secondgeneration Japanese-Americans, infra at Part III.
27 See infra at Part I (discussing cultural variations in kinship structures). Cf David D.
Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitutionof Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. REV. 791, 810-11
(2002) ("The Court's understanding of 'religion,' however, has been strikingly more expansive
and fluid than its conception of 'family."').
28 See infra at Part II(A)(2) (discussing the trap of historical practices binding subsequent
generations).
29 See infra at Part Ill (discussing cultural anthropologists' studies of kinship structures).
At the same time, this approach continues to rely upon individual rights protections afforded
by the U.S. Constitution as exemplified by Loving v. Virginia, so as to avoid the pitfall of
binding minority groups (and courts) to current but discriminatory majority group beliefs, but
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demonstrate that careful examination of those structures reveals a great
deal of variety in values and practices surrounding kinship ties. The
studies of historical kinship practices do the same. At a minimum, all of
these studies suggest that the Court's broad-sweeping declarations about
American families need to be revisited and closely reexamined.
Part II analyzes the central Supreme Court cases on kinship in the
areas of adult-child relations and the formation and regulation of adult
30
intimate relations. This Part discusses the fetishization of supposed
historical kinship practices caused by current substantive due process
doctrine and suggests that in some of those cases, the Court has an overly
simplistic understanding of what those practices were and meant.
Part III then turns to studies of kinship practices produced by anthropologists, historians and sociologists on families that depict a wide
range of kinship practices. This section first addresses some of the theoretical views in anthropology as to the nature of kinship. This Part argues that not only anthropology, but also other disciplines' studies of
American kinship practices should, but have not, informed the Court's
development of kinship doctrine. While one might argue that the Court
is ill equipped to adequately assess non-legal materials, this section first
notes that resort to non-legal materials in reaching its decisions is not
without precedent in the Supreme Court. 3 1 This section then demonwith the added guidance of recent anthropological theory which can serve to cabin substantive
due process doctrine.
30 The term "fetish" refers to "any thing or activity to which one is irrationally devoted."
WEBSTERS NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY

501 (1997). "Fetish" and "fetishism" often

reference eroticization of otherwise non-erotic objects. Id.
31 Since Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1907), the Justices have regularly referred to
non-legal materials in court opinions, whether in the form of dictionaries, newspapers, Internet
sites, or various other sources of support for their arguments. See Donald N. Bersoff & David
J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science
Research, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 279 n.2 (1996) (noting that Muller is the first case in
which the Court referenced social science materials, based in part on Louis Brandeis' brief,
which led to the coining of the term "Brandeis Brief' for legal briefs that cite social science
evidence); John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal
Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1184
(1996) (discussing the Court's reference to Brandeis' social science evidence in both Muller
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, n. I1(1954)). See also P. ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 173-77 (1976) (discussing Brown's footnote 11); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, Part III (1955) (discussing same); Sanjay
Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme
Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002) (arguing that the Brown Court did
not, in fact, rely on social science evidence in reaching its decision); James E. Ryan, The
Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1659 (2003); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137 (1990) (discussing non-use by the Court of
psychological evidence about juror behavior). Cf. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits ofa ScienJurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137, 148-50 (1990)
tific
(discussing instances of the Court rejecting psychological evidence in favor of "[the Court's]
own experience and common sense," or ignoring it altogether). See generally John Hasko,

442

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 13:431

strates that using social science descriptions of kinship practices brings
into question some of the Court's underlying rationales in some of its
cases.
Part III.A then describes several illustrative studies of kinship in the
United States, revealing the complexity discussed above. This Part further analyzes how the divergent kinship practices reflected in these studies would in some cases support and in other cases alter or undermine the
Court's conclusions as to American kinship norms and practices, and
thus theoretically might require the Justices to revisit the results of several specific cases.
This Article concludes that these anthropological, historical, and sociological studies not only bring into question the accuracy of the Court's
historical account, they also suggest that the Court's focus on historically
Western European kinship practices is now too narrow to adequately and
appropriately delineate an appropriate set of parameters for legal protections of contemporary kinship relations. The image that emerges from
this research is a multi-faceted picture of American cultural diversity of
kinship practices that can and do change both in practice and in meaning
over time. The Court's static, monocular image of American families
simply does not account for the reality of American kinship practices.
II.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILIES

This Part analyzes the Court's construction and deployment of specific definitions of family. A number of legal scholars have addressed
the relationship between law and the changing American family. 32 Some
scholars, most notably Martha Minow, have raised the concern about
narrow definitions of family generally, and have questioned whether
functional rather than formal definitions should control, but have done so
without engaging in a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's
doctrine on that point. 33 A number of other scholars have addressed the
Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIaR.
J. 427 (2002); Samual A. Thumma & Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries,47 BuFF. L. REV. 227
(1999) (presenting, at length, instances of the Court's citation to dictionaries in its opinions).
32 In addition to the sources cited in the footnotes that follow, see generally Meyer, SelfDefinition, supra note 27 (comparing the Court's narrow scope of family definition in contrast
with its broad scope in defining religion); Nancy Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian
Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L. Q. 523 (1999) (addressing the impact of
law on gay and lesbian families).
33 Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
269 (1991). Martha Fineman has also addressed the functional approach, albeit in less detail.
See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American
Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 394-96 (1993). See also Note, Looking for Family
Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104
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Court's limited definition of families. 34 Richard Storrow and David
Meyer, for instance, describe the Court's narrow definition of family
within the context of privacy doctrine generally. 35 Alison Harvison
Young has evaluated the Court's cases as they relate to new reproductive
technologies. 36 As a doctrinal way out of the Court's narrow definition
of family, David Meyer also has proposed an "open balancing approach"
that would weigh asserted state interests in withholding recognition of a
particular family relationship against the intrusion such a regulation
would have on individuals' self-definition of family. 37 Jill Elaine Hasday has discussed the limitations of the Court's family definitions in the
contexts of federalism and iocalism. 38 None of these scholars, other than
Minow in passing, suggest that the Court might look to sources of empirical data and discover a different picture of families in the United States
that could guide it in expanding the parameters of Constitutional protection. 39 Nor do any of these scholars address, as this section does, the
HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991); Angie Smolka, That's the Ticket: A New Way of Defining Family,
10 CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL'Y 629 (2001); cf Hubert J. Barnhardt, Let the Legislatures
Define the Family: Why Default Statutes Should Be Used to Eliminate Potential Confusion, 40
EMORY L. J. 571 (1991) (arguing for legislative control over defining families rather than the
courts, and briefly engaging in a description of the Court's cases in this area, but without
critiquing them); cf Note, Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the
Evolving American Family and the Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
2052 (2003) (discussing state law responses to reproductive technology's impact on family
structures).
34 See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 626 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the confusion in the Court's
cases following the rejection of substantive due process for economic legislation). For articles
specifically discussing the Supreme Court's narrow definition of family, see, e.g., C. Ray
Cliett, How a Note or a Grope Can be a Justificationfor the Killing of a Homosexual: An
Analysis of the Effects of the Supreme Court's Views on Homosexuals, African-Americans and
Women, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 219 (2003); Rebecca Ginzburg,
Altering "Family": Another Look at the Supreme Court's Narrow Protection of Families in
Belle Terre, 83 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2003) (describing the Court's family definition in Village of
Belle Terre in the context of communal living); Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family
Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American ConstitutionalLaw
and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REv. 527 (2001) (discussing the importance of family definitions because they circumscribe the scope of privacy rights); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions and the Constitution, 25 SUFFOLK L. REV. 981 (1991) (briefly discussing the Supreme
Court's cases in arguing for "family" being the root from which Constitutional rights should
flow); Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court'sBlind Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of Familial
Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 In Nguyen v. INS, 20
LAW & INEQ. 275 (2002).
35 David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527 (2000); see

Storrow, supra note 34.
36 Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigmof the
Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505 (1998).
37 Meyer, Self-Definition, supra note 27, at 837-44.
38 Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalismand the Family Reconstructed,45 UCLA L. REV. 1297
(1998).
39 See Minow, supra note 33; cf Meyer, Self-Definition, supra note 27, particularly
791-93 and 808-10 (pointing out the divergence between the Court's definition and the pic-
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particular lack of evidentiary support for the basic factual claim upon
which the Court privileges nuclear families-at least nuclear marital
families-over other family forms: namely, that marriage sits at the
center of American kinship. Finally, although several scholars have addressed functional approaches to family definitions, none have tracked
the Court's own ambivalence about a formal versus functional ap40
proaches to definitions of families.
This Part first outlines the central themes revealed in the review of
the Court's cases. Analysis of the cases themselves moves roughly, but
not exclusively, chronologically. This Part first addresses the Court's
earliest cases discussing family relationships, albeit dicta in these cases,
the Court's rhetoric about families, and marriage in particular, is subsequently picked up in its later cases where family-related rights begin to
be defined. This Part then explores the shift in the Court's cases from
rhetorical accounts of marriage to its deployment of that language in
grounding other family-related rights of adult intimates. The discussion
then moves to the Court's handling of adult-child kinship ties, again
demonstrating how these ties in some cases end up as derivative of a
marital tie, despite the fact that that marital tie had not yet been established as a fundamental right by the Court. Next, this Part addresses the
Court's actual right to marry decisions. Finally, this Part addresses the
Court's specific cases that embrace broader notions of family, first addressing family ties between adults and children and then ties between
adults in non-marital relationships and conduct that occurs in those
relationships.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT AND KINSHIP

Whom do we name as "family"? Should legal recognition and protection of inter-personal relationships turn on the form of or on the functions served by these relationships? 4 1 In the case of a divergence
between expressed beliefs (whether in the form of a statute, or otherwise)
ture of the modem American family as revealed by the U.S. Census, but noting that the
Court's current family jurisprudence will not allow for expansion to include these changing
families).
40 Id.; see also Paris R. Baldacci, Pushing the Law to Encompass the Reality of Our
Families: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Familiesfrom Eviction from Their Homes-Braschi's

FunctionalDefinition of "Family" and Beyond, 21 FORDHAM UR. L.J. 973 (1994); William C.
Duncan, "Don't Ever Take the Fence Down": The "Functional" Definition of Family-Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J. L. & Fam. Stud. 57 (2001). Many of these
authors focus upon state law cases such as Braschi v. Stahl, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (functional definition of family in housing context), and Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321
(1990) (functional definition used in custody context).
41 For an argument in support of a functionalist approach to families, see the more recent
version of Martha Minow's article, Redefining Families, supra note 33, reprinted in FAMILIES
INTHE U.S. 7. (2d ed. 1998).
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42
The approach to
and actual practices, which of these should trump?
answering these questions that has been taken by the Court in its cases
addressing family-related Constitutional rights yields an image of American kinship that is significantly at odds with depictions in the social sciences' competing descriptions.
The Court's family-related cases fall under several different Constitutional provisions and doctrines. First, the Fourteenth Amendment's
44
Equal Protection Clause 43 covers several of these cases. Second, as the
45
Court points out in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process doctrine trigger the protections found in many of
46
Third, the related, and, in one view,
the Court's family law cases.

Justice Scalia would say that statutes should trump practices. See, e.g., Michael H.,
491 U.S. at n.2. Adultery is one example of a divergence between societally expressed beliefs-both in the form of criminal statutes against it and in non-legal verbalization of disapproval-and actual practices of all-too common adultery among adults in the U.S. . See C.
Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters, But Does Adultery?: Adultery and Honor in the U.S. Military,
9 U.C.L.A. WOMEN's L. J. 177 n.9 (1999) (discussing disjuncture between American's expressed views on adultery versus their actual practices in the context of Monicagate).
To investigate this divergence further, one might also ask, in what way are social relations
different from professional relations? For instance, what, if anything, distinguishes an emotionally detached, but fiscally engaged parent/child relationship from an employer/employee or
trust/trustee relationship? Parkin makes this exact distinction, that kinship relations are opposed to master/servant or other comparable relationships. See PARKIN, supra note 6. One
might also then ask, to what extent and in what way are these apparent differences meaningful
or important? These related queries fall outside the scope of the focus of this Article but
would be a logical starting point for further exploration of this issue.
43 U. S. CONST., amend. XIV, §1.
44 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (discussing the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting marriage restrictions based on the race of
the parties); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)(same, in the context of the class of poor
persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972)(rights of unmarried persons to determine whether to bear or beget a child is protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Both Loving and Zablocki are also arguably substantive due process
cases. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12-13, and Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384, both discussing marriage
as a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. My contention is that neither of these cases can be understood without taking into account the race- and
class-based aspects of the statutory provisions challenged in those cases.
45 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decision whether or not to have an abortion is a liberty interest within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment), reaffirmed in Casey,
505 U.S. at 846-51; Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03; but cf ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39,
at 596-98, 603 (discussing the Court's focus on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the
Due Process Clause from 1890-1936 and then again after 1937 and ultimately the blending of
substantive due process and equal protection analysis). In 1938, the Court decided United
States v. Carolene Products Co., in which the majority "indicated it might not follow the
rejection of substantive due process in areas which touched upon specific constitutional guarantees or disadvantaged certain minority groups." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39. at 627
(discussing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938)). As discussed
above, the Court's substantive due process doctrine draws upon the right to liberty contained
within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See infra at 22; U. S. CONST.,
42
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overarching, right to privacy 4 7 underlies some of these and several other
cases discussed below. 48 Each of these Constitutional provisions triggers
its own analytical framework, with varying degrees and variations in emphasis on history.
The following discussion focuses upon many of the central Supreme
Court cases addressing family relationships and the regulation of behavior within those relationships. Four themes or threads appear in the cases
discussed in this section. First, one finds broad rhetorical pronouncements touching on various disciplines including history, sociology, and
psychology. 49 Second, as discussed above, we see the Court resorting to
history in various ways and with varying degrees of depth of analysis, as
support for its rulings or as defining the proper result in the cases before
it.50 Third, in these cases the Court engages in the legal construction of
kinship, by establishing definitional parameters of "family," but at the
same time moving back and forth between very narrow and very broad
definitions of "who's in[side] and who's out[side]" 5' of the defined area.
Finally, one can see a shift from case to case in the Court's focus on the
forms (and formal legal status) of kinship relations, to a focus on the
functions that kinship ties serve, and then back again to an emphasis on
AMEND. XIV, § 1. See also, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding parents' right to control children's upbringing constitutes a liberty interest within the scope of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Loving, 388 U.S. at I (right to marry is a
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); cases discussed infra
at note 43.
47 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 34, at 634. Many of the cases discussed herein
are often described as privacy cases, although some of them in fact never actually refer to any
right to privacy. One view is that the right to privacy is an after-the-fact unifying gloss developed by the Court (and now expanded upon by commentators), which refers to these earlier
cases as falling within its rubric. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 ("While the outer limits of [the
right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions relating to marriage ... procreation, . . . contraception ... family relationships...
and child rearing and education.")). See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490, 547 (1989) (Blackmun J., concurring and dissenting in part). It is primarily the
contraception and abortion cases, and tangentially the right to marry cases, that refer explicitly
to the right to privacy, while other cases focus on equal protection or more general language
about fundamental rights or liberty interests. In a related way, the "state's interest" prong of
substantive due process analysis was developed subsequent to the original development of the
doctrine itself. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphiosfor Neutral Principlesin
Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudenceof Oprah!, 90 GEO. L. J.
2087 n.131 and accompanying text (2002).
48 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married person's right to
contraception falls within the right to privacy derived from the penumbra of several of the
rights outlined in the Bill of Rights); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
49 See, the discussion of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, (1878), infra at notes
54-61 and accompanying text.
50 See infra at Part II.A.
51 Minow, Redefining Families, supra note 33. See also infra Part II.A.
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forms. 52 Each of these themes creates the space or opportunity for consideration of sociological and cultural anthropological studies and theory
of kinship practice.
1.

The Court's Deployment of Marriage Rhetoric as a
Persuasive, Rather than Doctrinal Tool

The modern-day Court's kinship and family-related decisions sit
squarely within its substantive due process and privacy doctrine; the development of substantive due process and privacy protection in the context of kinship occurred primarily during the 1960s through 1980s,
perhaps then abandoned for a decade and then picked up again in State v.
Lawrence.53 A century prior to this time, however, the Supreme Court,
in Reynolds v. United States,54 first directly addressed the interface between families and the Constitution. 55 In Reynolds and several other
cases, both ancient and contemporary, the Court employed grand rhetoric
about families in general and marriage in particular to bolster its decisions on such diverse topics as legislative power, polygamy, and contraception. 56 While the particular substantive topics in those cases are less
directly relevant to the discussion here, and although these sweeping
statements about family and marriage are not necessarily even critical to
the outcome of those cases, the early rhetoric flavors subsequent decisions to such a degree that they require separate attention.
a.

The Early Kinship Rhetoric Cases: Marriage as Bedrock in
Reynolds v. United States and Maynard v. Hill

The Court began its project of describing and circumscribing families in an opening volley involving Utah's proscription of polygamy.
Upholding the conviction of a Mormon polygamist despite his free exercise of religion claim, the Court stated in Reynolds that:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and until the establishId.
See Meyer, supra note 15, at 805-06 (noting that the Court has not followed "a single
course" in defining the parameters of family privacy). Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, available at Paper ID: Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 85 http://papers.ssm.
com/paper.taf?abstractid=512662; (March 2004).
54 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (8 Otto) 145, (1878).
55 Professor Peggy Cooper Davis points out that in Meister v. Moore, 76 U.S. 96 (1877),
a case decided a year prior to Reynolds, property ownership turned on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of what was essentially a common law marriage. As Professor Davis also notes, however, this earlier case was not a Fourteenth Amendment case falling squarely within the
development of family law doctrine. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORMS: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES, 29-30 (1997).
56 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 535 (1965).
52
53
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ment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a
57
feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.
The Court's factual claim here-that polygamy has "always been odious
among northern and western nations of Europe . . . [and] was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people "-is
problematic for a number of reasons. First, the statement may well be
factually accurate, but the Court fails to cite to any evidence in its opinion to support the empirical claim. In addition, neither of the parties
cited to any evidence in their briefs that would lend support to the factual
claim and that we might imagine the Court was referencing when it
penned this statement.5 8 To reach its conclusion on this factual point,
therefore, what did the Court rely upon? The absence of actual evidence
or testimony or citation to authority on this point suggests that most
likely the Court relied upon its own beliefs about the reality it described.
To push the point further, perhaps individual justices relied upon their
knowledge of their own "northern and western European" family ancestry-that the practice of polygamy was absent from European cultures.
This reliance upon a generalized sense of history, of historical practices,
and more particularly one's own family history as indicative of actual
historical practice, again might have hit the factual bull's-eye in Reynolds. What is troubling, however, is that absent any documentation for
the factual claim, the Court's statement suggests subjective "fact-finding" on the part of the Court.
Second, when the Court focused its temporal and geographical gaze
on the United States at the time the First Amendment was ratified, it
noted that most states in the Union had passed anti-polygamy statutes
prior to ratification. The Court therefore concluded that the First
Amendment was not intended to protect polygamy, even if under religious auspices. 59 Subsequent cases-most notably Lawrence v. Texas 6 0clearly demonstrate the frailty of factual claims based either on the kind
of subjective basis noted in the preceding paragraph or wide-sweeping
claims about historical practices in intimate relationships where those
claims are based on superficial analyses of statutory pronouncements.
The Court did not stop there, but added an important flourish, arguably dicta in Reynolds itself, but in hindsight one that was relevant to
the Court's ultimate development of privacy doctrine in the mid-1900s.
In reaching its decision, the Reynolds Court specifically characterized
marriage as:
57 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (upholding a conviction for bigamy).
58 See LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATES, VOL. 8.

59 Id.

60 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

OF THE UNITED
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. . .this most important feature of social life. Upon it

society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties,
61
with which government is necessarily required to deal.
It is this language, placing marriage at the apex of civilization, which is
reproduced (albeit often without citation to Reynolds itself) in many of
the Court's family law cases from this point forward.
Further, however, the Court's reference to and disparagement of polygamous practice-and I emphasize practices here as opposed to
laws--of "Asiatic and African people" exhibits not only what now is
seen as a provincial and bigoted sentiment, but more importantly, it reflects the Court's dismissiveness of the existence of "African and Asiatic
people" then living in the United States. For African people, this was
almost exclusively a result of enslavement rather than choice. While the
Court may well have been able to rationally justify circumscribing legal
protections to those family structures protected in the countries upon
which the American legal system drew its structure and doctrine and thus
justify its patent blindness to the existence to those not of that ancestral
derivation, this is not how the Court justified its narrow focus. It justified the focus by rhetorical fiat.
Ten years after Reynolds was decided, the Court again waxed poetic
on the position of marriage in U.S. kinship structures. In Maynard v.
Hill,62 the Court's dicta 63 echoed Reynolds' rhetoric when the court decided that a state legislature had the power to regulate divorce. Bracketing its analysis of the legislature's power, based in part on the historical
practice in England and the colonies allowing such control, the Court
stated:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of
a people than any other institution ...is an institution, in

the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress." 64
Later in the opinion, the Court continued in this vein, describing marriage as "a relation the most important, as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest
61 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
62 Mayard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
63 1 refer to this language as dicta, because the case was primarly a seperation of powers
case.
64 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). Griswold also uses similarly florid
language.
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tie of social life, and the true basis of human progress. ' 65 Again, as was
true in Reynolds, the Maynard court cited to no evidence supporting what
is essentially an empirical claim. The only citation by the Court is to two
earlier state law cases that similarly cite to no supporting evidence. 66 In
these opinions, the Justices created a fragile but ultimately powerful base
upon which many of its kinship cases would build.
b.

20th Century Kinship Quasi-Rhetoric Cases: Linking
Reproduction to Marriage in Skinner and Griswold

While Reynolds and Maynard stand as examples of kinship rhetoric
or dicta, two twentieth century cases bridge the gap between rhetoric
about the importance of marriage and substantive rights determinations.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma67 and Griswold v. Connecticut,68 the Court confronted constitutional claims related to reproductive decision-making. In
the course of addressing those claims, discussed below, the Court explicitly linked otherwise freestanding rights claims to a broader claim about
yet to
the social centrality of marriage, despite the fact that the Court had
69
hold that marriage itself was a Constitutionally protected right.
Skinner, decided in the early 1940s, constituted one of the notable
exceptions to the Court's otherwise hands-off approach to families prior
to the 1960s. 70 In Skinner, the Court struck down a statute that allowed
the forced sterilization of a person convicted of a crime. The Skinner
Court rejected the eugenics approach previously espoused by Justice
Holmes in Buck v. Bell,7 1 who, when writing for the majority upholding
forced sterilization, spoke the now infamous words "[t]hree generations
65 Id. at 211-12.
66 Id. at 190, 205, 211 (1888), citing Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863) and
Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181 (1838). These cases in turn cite to older cases that merely
repeat the same error.
67 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
68 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69 It was not until two years after Griswold was decided, that the Court found an arguably qualified fundamental right to marry in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), discussed
infra at notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
70 Other family rights cases decided during the first half of the century revolved primarily around parenting rights, including Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to control child's upbringing and education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (also
dealing with upbringing and education); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (upholding a state law forbidding "street preaching by children"). See discussion of
parenting rights infra at Part II.A.2.a. That the Court took on and challenged the practice of
eugenics in Skinner during the time that the Nazis were engaging in the practice is perhaps
coincidental, but nonetheless notable.
71 Buck. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Buck v. Bell-a terse opinion-cited to neither history

nor science in reaching its conclusion. Rather, it simply analyzed the statute in question and
deferred to the State legislature's findings as to its necessity, and the State's interpretation of it
to allow forced sterilization.
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of imbeciles are enough. '72 In Skinner, the Court emphasized the importance of procreation, stating that, "[w]e are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man."'73 Possibly to qualify a holding that otherwise would have stood for the proposition that
procreation itself was a fundamental right, standing on its own, the Court
added: "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."' 74 In this way, then, the Skinner court tied procreative rights directly to the formal institution of marriage-albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, something that would echo in its
75
subsequent decisions in Griswold and later in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
Again, just as was the case in Reynolds and Maynard, the Court cited to
no authority for the point, but appears to have seen it as something so
clear that it could-in effect-take judicial notice of it.
The tie between marriage and procreative rights was made more
explicit in Griswold,76 best known for establishing the Constitutional
right to privacy. 77 In Griswold, the Court's plurality opinion held that a
Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally
intruded upon the right of marital privacy and the Constitution's protection against government invasion of the "sanctity of home" and "privacies of life." In reaching its decision, the Court-again without
citation-opined that marriage is "intimate to the degree of being sacred"
and "an association that promotes a way of life."' 78 Thus, in Griswold,
the Court again emphasized its valuation of marriage in expanding the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and accorded Constitutional protection for conduct within marriage. Like Skinner, this ruling was issued in
a world where the Court still had yet to hold that there was Constitutional
protection for the marriage itself. The Court's descriptive project concerning families yielded this concrete result: this newly described right to
contraception flow from status, where that status yet remained a legal
chimera.
I do not include Griswold here, in the discussion of dicta or rhetoric,
to suggest that the importance-of-marriage language in this decision was
72 Id. at 207.
73 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.

Id.
75 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110 (1989). On a simpler level, however, Skinner forms the
background for the Court's procreative decision-making cases that form the core of its privacy
doctrine.
76 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77 See Martha Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy,
23 CONN. L. REv. 955 n.16 and accompanying text (1991) (arguing that Griswold forms the
core of privacy doctrine).
78 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
74
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mere dicta when it was decided. 79 However, the Court has since determined, in Eisenstadtv. Baird,discussed further below, 80 that the right to
contraception inheres not in the marital relationship, but in the individual. Because of the Court's decision in Eisenstadt, the marriage-as-central language in Griswold now must be understood as not at all intrinsic
to the right to contraception itself. Nonetheless, law review articles, appellate briefs, and the Supreme Court opinions since Eisenstadtcontinue
to quote lines from Griwsold which have become, in essence if not in
actuality, dicta rather than critical to determination of the right at issue in
the case.
Reynolds, Skinner, and Griswold, and more indirectly, Maynard, all
stand for the idea that marriage is the primary intimate relationship, upon
which all other relationships and structures-be they familial, social, or
political-rely and build. Additionally, these cases collectively stand for
the notion that marriage is the fundamental and pre-existing core for
other Constitutional protections (or lack thereof) for family structures
(excluding polygamous marriages) and kinship-related functions (e.g.
procreation).
The rhetoric outlining these broad claims is picked up and reiterated
in many (but not all) of the Court's subsequent kinship cases, particularly
(but not exclusively) those dealing with protections for adult intimate
relationships as discussed in the next section. Further, however, as the
foregoing discussion demonstrates, factual backing for these claims is
not made clear in the cases which pronounced them, although subsequent
cases did attempt to fill in this gap a little. As discussed in Part III,
however, anthropologists have long agreed that marriage or marriagelike ties quite often are substantially less important to members of different cultural groups in the United States than1 other sorts of kin ties,
8
whether they be parent-child, or sibling ties.
2.

Substantive Due Process and the Doctrinal Demand for
HistoricalAnalysis: "Parent"/"Child"Rights, and Adult
Intimate Relationship Rights

In addition to adult intimate relationships as a category of family
ties (whether they be monogamous heterosexual marital relationships, or
some other form), the Court has grappled with the scope of protection for
kin- or kin-like ties between adults and children. Early cases focused on
79 For Justice Harlan, it was essentially as a precondition to the existence of the Constitutional privacy interest. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (Harlan, J., concurring); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (Harlan, J., concurring)
80 See infra at notes 201-203 and accompanying text (discussing Eisenstadt v. Baird).
81 See infra Part III (discussing anthropological studies).
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situations involving nuclear biological families. Later cases deal with
the complexities of other family forms.
Some forty years after the Court initially dealt with the interface
between families and the Constitution in Reynolds and Maynard it directly addressed the scope of Constitutional protection for families and
family structure in a pair of cases addressing one aspect of the relationship between parents and children: education. This time the Court faced
the issue within the context of Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protection, which triggered a doctrinal evaluation of historical
practices.
On its face, the Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty and
property against government incursion. 82 In a simplistic way, what constitutes a protected liberty interest is that which falls within the scope of
what the Court dubs "substantive due process. '83 Wary of the Lochnerian84 slippery slope should the Court outline the scope of substantive due
process without any objective framework for guidance, 85 the Court has
suggested that "[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come not
from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."86

If, however, as demonstrated in this and the following Parts, history
tells several different and competing tales about American kinship practices, then the cabining guidance yearned for by the Court in its substantive due process jurisprudence, and which at least some Justices imagine
subsists in historical analysis, may in fact be more amorphous and malleable than it is determinate and constraining. 87 Moreover, this may represent an inescapable problem.8 8 As Peggy Cooper Davis puts it:
Doctrinal stories inevitably reflect perspective. They
take selectively from history and culture. This is only
natural. History and culture cannot be captured in all
their richness and complexity. It is necessary to summarize. It is necessary to put some things in the foreground, to put some in the background, and to ignore
82 U.

S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §1.

83 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03.
84 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
85 Id. at 502 n.9.
86 Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501).
87 As discussed further, infra at footnotes 145-150 and accompanying text, some members of the Court have noted this exact point, that substantive due process analysis and determination of which traditions are important is inherently subjective. Justice Brennan, in
particular, has directly challenged Justice Scalia's belief that historical analysis provides the
yearned-for constraint. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 13, at 1352-53 (discussing the problems with analysis of
history in substantive due process cases).
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others. It follows that when judges draw upon history or
culture, they necessarily draw upon partial accounts, accounts that accentuate certain historical or cultural forces
and minimize or ignore others. The Supreme Court's
89
doctrine of family liberty is no exception.
While I may disagree with Professor Davis' conclusion that this partial
90
story is inevitable, she and I do agree (as do others) that the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence at best does not present a complete picture of
American kinship practices and beliefs, and at worst presents an inaccurate picture. 9 '
a.

The Scope of Protection for "Parent"/"Child" Relationships

(1) The Early Cases: The Parent-ChildRelationship and the
Right of Parents to Control the Upbringing of their
Children
In a pair of education-related decisions decided in the 1920s, Meyer
v. Nebraska92 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 3 the Court began to elaborate upon substantive due process protection for family relationships in
establishing that parents have a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment in parenting their children. 94 In Meyer, the Court held that
the right to study the German language in a private school was a protected liberty interest. 95 "Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint, but also ... the right ... to marry, estab89 DAVIS, supra note 55, at 6.

90 See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, Selective Conceptions of Federalism: The Selective Use of
History in the Supreme Court's States' Rights Opinions, 50 EMORY L.J. 1295 (2001); Nancy
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
91 It may also be the case that the historical approach reflects what Justice Hugo Black
called illegitimate "natural law due process philosophy." See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 516
(Black, J., dissenting). Cf DAvIs, supra note 55, at 7-8 (arguing that the struggle over the
definition of family reflects a deeper struggle over communitarianism versus individualism).
92 262 U.S. at 399 (1923) (describing the right to bring up children as fundamental;
stating also, in dicta, that the rights to work and marry are also fundamental).
93 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
94 The right to control the education of one's children is further expounded by the Court
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Although Pierce and Meyer are the important
turning point in the Court's development of substantive due process protection for families,
earlier cases arose at least as early as 1888. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 34, at
576-77, 583. See generally Edward Corwin, Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REV. 366, 380-84 (1911). The watershed for substantive due process was the controversial decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Just three years after Lochner,
the Court decided Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which Louis Brandeis presented
his now famous "Brindeis-brief," the first time a Supreme Court brief included social science
and other non-legal information for consideration by the Court. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 34, at 588; supra note 31.
95 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (1923).
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lish a home and bring up children ... ,"96 Presaging the use of legislative enactments to cabin substantive due process doctrine, the Meyer
Court cites to the Ordinance of 1787 in support for its claim that: "[t]he
American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently
promoted. '97 This reference to history is implicitly if not explicitly
linked to a determination of a protected interest under the Due Process
98
Clause of parenting and educating one's children.
Citing Meyer, two years later the Court similarly held in Pierce that
parents have a liberty interest in the upbringing and education of their
children and that legislation mandating that children attend public school
unconstitutionally interfered with this right. 99 According to the Court,
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."'00 The Pierce decision did not engage in historical analysis or comment, but instead rested
its decision squarely on the holding in Meyer with little additional
discussion.
With respect to the Court's working out of Constitutional protections for various kinship relationships, Meyer and Pierce thus arguably
stand for the proposition that (biological) parents' control over their (biological) children, in many, if not most, circumstances, 10 is superior to
states' interest in those same children. As discussed in Part III, this particular privileging of the parental relationship is not necessarily reflected
equally in all cultural groups in the United States.' 0 2 We will revisit the
right to parent in the context of the Court's troubling unmarried fathers'
96 Id. at 399.
97 Id.
98 As

Professor Dorothy Brown has noted, it also may constitute an inaccurate statement
of history, insofar as public education was neither originally free nor required. Personal communication with Dorothy Brown, October 2003.
99 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (statute mandating that all children attend public school
interferes with parents' liberty interest in parenting and directing the education of their
children).
100 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. See also E. Gary Spitko, Creaturesof the State: Contracting
for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1139. 1182-83 (2000) (discussing the Court's holding in Pierce). Note that this language-"those who nurture"-does not apply just to biological parents, but also to caregivers
more generally.
101 The child protection (originally referred to as the "child savers") movement during the
1970s and 1980s undercut this notion significantly. During this time, Congress began passing
child protection legislation aimed at intervening into families where children were being
abused or neglected. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5102 (2003).
102 See discussion of the Navajo, infra at Part III(A)(2)(a), and particularly the Navajo
Supreme Court's decision involving custody litigation between a Navajo father and Indian
non-Navajo mother, infra at footnote 271.
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rights decisions, which implicate both the right to parent and the concept
of the "marital family."
(2)

What Is a Parent and What Does a ParentDo?: The Right
to ParentRevisited (and Constrained)in the Court's
UnmarriedFather's Rights Cases

With the arrival of the 1960s, the Court finally engaged the question
of the Constitution's protection of kinship rights and relationships in earnest, this time under a combination of equal protection analysis, substantive due process doctrine, and under the more general rubric of privacy.
The Court's family-related cases during this period focused primarily on
three subjects: marriage, 10 3 unmarried fathers' rights, 1°4 and reproductive
05
rights.'

In Stanley v. Illinois,10 6 the Court issued the first of three critical
decisions in deciding the scope of Constitutional protection for one group
of family members previously granted only meager protection: unmarried fathers.' 0 7 The Court held in Stanley that by denying an unmarried
father a hearing on his fitness as a parent prior to institution of adoption
proceedings, yet extending it to married parents whose custody is challenged, the state denied him equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 8 The Equal Protection rubric did not require the
Court to engage in historical analysis, although in reaching its decision,
the Stanley Court did reiterate language from prior substantive due process decisions that "emphasized the importance of the family" and "the
integrity of the family unit."' 10 9
More importantly, however, by extending Constitutional protection
to a parent not within the confines of a traditional marital family, the
Court took a step toward expanding its previously constrained notion of
American kinship, pointing out that the law has not "refused to recognize
those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. 110 As
the Court noted, albeit consistently without citation to empirical support,
103 Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (1967); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (1978).

104 See e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110 (1989).
105 See e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (1965)(right of married persons to have access to
contraceptives); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1978) (right of minors to access
contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (requirements of spousal
consent and parental consent for minors to abortion unconstitutional). See also Fineman,
supra notes 77 and 17 and accompanying text (1991) (discussing how privacy doctrine focuses
on reproductive fights).
106 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
107 In its unmarried fathers' rights cases, the Court clearly is engaged in distinguishing
divorced fathers from those who were never married to the mothers of their children.
108 Id. at 658 (Illinois statute is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause).
109 Id. at 651 (citing Meyer, Skinner, Griswold, and Prince).
110 Id. at 651.
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the "familial bonds [in non-marital families are] just as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized family
unit." II' In Stanley, then, we see the Court referencing and adding to
legal recognition of family structures falling outside the narrow confines
of the marital nuclear family, but also continuing to make generalized
statements about the function of families, this time more sociological and
psychological, albeit in a more expansive or inclusive way than it had
done previously.
Based on its holding in Stanley, one might have expected the Court
differently in what was the next of the trio of unmarried fathers'
hold
to
13
rights cases a decade later. 1 2 In Lehr v Robertson, the Court held that
where a putative father had not established a substantial relationship with
his child, 114 failure to give him notice of the pending adoption of that
1 15
child did not violate either his due process or equal protection rights.
Referencing the comments of the dissenting justices in its recently decided case, Caban v. Mohammed," 6 the Lehr Court distinguished between what it termed a "mere biological link" and an "actual relationship
of parental responsibility."' 17 Quoting Justice Stewart's dissent in
Caban, the Lehr Court confirmed that in its eyes, "[p]arental rights do
not spring full blown from the biological connection between parent and
' 8 Notably, Justice
child. They require relationships more enduring.""
Stewart's Caban dissent focused on the substantive due process claim in
that case, which triggered his suggestion about the importance of a right
111Id.

at 652.
112 The Court ruled similarly in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating
a New York statute that allowed children to be adopted without the natural father's consent,
but not without mother's consent, where unmarried father had lived with his children and their
mother for several years because the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause). The lower
court in Lehr had ruled that Caban was inapplicable since it was not decided until after the
adoption order was entered. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at n.7. Cf Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978) (denying putative father's claim where he had failed to petition for legitimation for 11
years and he was afforded a hearing to contest the adoption and determination was made based
on the best interests of the child. Equal protection not violated where divorced father was
treated differently than unmarried father).
113 463 U.S. 248 (1982).
114 The dissent in Lehr paints a dramatically different picture of the biological father's
efforts to parent, suggesting that his failure to parent was due to the mother's hiding the child
from him so as to frustrate his efforts. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 266-67. Even though the state knew of the father's whereabouts, the fact that
the father did not technically comply with the statute's requirements of filling out a postcard
for the putative father registry was fatal.
116 Id. at 259-60 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397). Caban established that
unmarried mothers and fathers stood on an equal footing with respect to a right to oppose the
adoption of their biological child. Caban, 441 U.S. at 380 (1979)
117 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248.
118 Id. at 260. On the use of dissents as support in subsequent cases, see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000).
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being grounded on tradition.'" 9 By contrast, the Caban majority had explicitly avoided the discussion of liberty interests and therefore historical
analysis, by resting its holding on Equal Protection analysis. 120 According to the Lehr court, where an unwed father actually steps forward and
demonstrates a "full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood"
responsibilities in the form of contributing to the rearing of the child, "at
that point it may be said that he '[acts] as a father toward his children.' "121 Thus, in Lehr we see the Court actively delineating who is
and who is not a parent to a child, defined by what that "potential" or
theoretical parent does or does not do and whether that behavior is in
accord with the Court's definition of what a "true" parent is and does.1 22
In one view, the Lehr Court appears to be tightening the boundaries
of who is and is not a family member. At the same time, however, the
Court also shifts those same boundaries in a way that has a loosening
effect. That is, by focusing on the function (engaging in parent-like behavior),' 23 rather than the form (i.e., the mere "biological link"), the Lehr
Court thereby creates a moment-an opportunity-for non-biological de
facto parents to assert parental rights to children.' 24 This latter conception which focuses on actual kinship-related behavior of people, rather
than formalistic structure, is directly in line with the approach suggested
in this Article, a view that is also supported by cultural anthropologists'
studies of kinship practices in the United States.
The Lehr dissent disagreed with the majority on this central point,
and argued that the simple existence of the biological relationship was
119 Caban, 441 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
120 Id. at n.16.
121 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7 and discussing a demonstration by unmarried father to the full commitment to parenting required, reasoning that parental
rights develop from an ongoing parent-child relationship, not from a mere biological link).
122 Interestingly, the majority explicitly states that, "[t]he.. .actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds," while it ignores the fact that its ruling effectively severs that
bond-or at least what that bond stands for: a parent-child link. It also ignores that it is
ultimately also concurrently creating legal bonds in its ruling. Id. at 261. See also Janet
Dolgin, Choice, Tradition and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the Ideology of the
Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 542 (2000) (discussing Schneider's finding that "blood relatives share biogenetic substance" and that this substance "is a symbol of unity, of oneness, and
this is symbolically interchangeable with the symbol of love.").
123 The Court also focuses on what families do, rather than their form, when it cites language from Smith v. Organization of Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977), on what is important about family relationships more generally: "[T]he importance of

the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays
in '[promoting] a way of life' through the instruction of children ... as well as from the fact of
blood relationship." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (quoting Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (quoting Yoder,
406 U.S. at 231-33).
124 It also theoretically opens the door for challenges by defacto parents to less-than-ideal
parenting conduct by biological fathers and mothers, thus raising the bar on biological parents
to beef up their actual parenting behavior.
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sufficient to constitute parental status. Valorizing the biological relationship as central (as opposed to the majority's determination that it merely
created an opportunity to develop a parenting relationship), the dissent
argued that a "'mere biological relationship' is not as unimportant in
determining the nature of liberty interests as the majority suggest[ed] ....[since t]he usual understanding of family implies biological
12 5
relationships."'
The majority and dissent in Lehr thus disagree on the centrality of
biology to the parent-child connection and consequently, on the scope of
the unmarried father's protected liberty interest. Both opinions bolster
these arguments with similar factual claims about the ordinary person's
understanding of family: when one engages in parenting types of behavior "it may be said that" one is a parent (in the case of the majority), and
biological connection as inherent to the "usual understanding of families" (in the case of the dissent). These two positions-form as primary
versus function as primary-come head to head in the Court's final unmarried fathers rights case: Michael H. v. Gerald. D.
In Michael H., one of its more troubling family law decisions, 126 the
Court continued the trend begun in Lehr of denying unmarried fathers'
rights to parent their children, this time not in response to an equal protection claim, but to a substantive due process claim. 127 In so doing,
however, the Court backed away from the functionalist approach it had
taken in Lehr and reverted to a formalist approach, although this time
focusing not on the formal biological link between father and child, but
instead grounding parental rights on the formal structure of the family as
28
a whole. 1
In Michael H., 129 the undisputed 130 biological unmarried father
(Michael H.) conceived a child (Victoria) with Carole D., who was married to Gerald D. at the time of conception and throughout the litigation. 131 From the time of her birth until the time Carole finally reconciled
with her husband, Michael actively parented Victoria, living with her and
125 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 271-72 (arguing that a biological connection is a Constitutionally
protected interest in and of itself that exists regardless of how well-developed the relationship
is between a parent and child, and arguing that most decisions have stressed the importance of
this "biological connection" in defining "family").
126 See Meyer, supra note 15, at 761-62 (discussing the Court's decision in Lehr).
127 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
128 See id. at n.4 and accompanying text. Cf at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite
his primary emphasis on the relationship created at law-the marital one-Scalia engages in
an odd reversion to biological rhetoric, seeming to invoke a natural law framework at one
point: "California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Id. at 118.
Law and nature are seen as aligned, and, in this case, aligned against social and actual practice.
129

Id. at 100.

130

Id. at 160 (white, J., dissenting).

131 Id. at 115.
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her mother at various points, providing financial support, and affirmatively holding her "out as his own" child. 132 Michael plainly satisfied the
combined biological and active-parent requirements of Lehr.133 Victoria
also asserted an interest in continued visitation with her father. Because
of a state law presumption of paternity in the marital father where a child
was born into an intact marriage, the trial court dismissed Michael's petition for visitation.
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, agreed. The plurality found
that Michael failed to prove that his "liberty interest" in parenting Victoria was one so "deeply embedded within [society's] traditions" as to be a
fundamental right worthy of substantive due process protection. The
plurality characterized Michael's interest as that of an adulterous parent. 1 34 Having thus categorized him that way, the plurality spends part
of its analysis on the historical basis for the presumption of paternity
itself. This analysis draws upon what Justice Scalia terms "older
sources"I 3 5-legal treatises and commentaries by scholars such as
Nicholas' in 1836 or Blackstone's Commentaries in 1826, but also including more recent texts from the mid-1900s. 136 In so doing, Justice
Scalia suggests that this historical support for the presumption hints at
historical disrespect for the claim of a biological father in Michael's position. To the extent that "embedded in tradition" means embedded in
legal tradition, as opposed to social or cultural tradition, perhaps Blackstone's views should matter. However, as the dissent notes, Scalia fails
to interrogate whether the rationales asserted in these older treatises for
the presumption-such as to protect inheritance and succession-have
continued validity today.' 37 He relied upon these treatises' mere existence to support his conclusion that Michael had no liberty interest. 138
Again, as the dissent notes, this also begs the question of whether, with
the advent of DNA testing, some of the asserted rationales such as preserving the "tranquility of States and families" still carry the same weight
today.
In addition, Justice Scalia interpolated from the Court's earlier unmarried fathers' rights cases-Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr-that
they in fact rested upon "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not
132 Id. at 113-15, 143-44 (Brennan, J., concurring). The formal ruling asserted the constitutionality of a state statute that created a presumption that a child born into marriage is
child of marriage, regardless of actual genetic parentage. In passing, the Court also held that
the child did not have a due process right to maintain filial relationship with both "fathers"
despite that child's request to do so.
133 Even Justice Scalia agreed on this point. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
134 Id. at 120.
135 Id.at 125.
136 Id.
137 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
138 See, e.g., Storrow, supra note 34, at 594-604.
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be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to relationships that develop
39
within" what he neatly dubs "the unitary family"' and thus not on the
notion that parenting, in and of itself, was "deeply embedded" in tradition. 140 A unitary family, Scalia tells us, is "typified, of course, by the
marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and
their children."' 14 Focusing on the requirement of co-residence and dipping his toe back into functionalist mode, Justice Scalia notes that Stanley involved an actively engaged, if non-marital, father who also co42
resided with his children and their mother for 18 years.1 Co-residence
as definitive of "family," we learn from the cultural anthropologists'
studies, is far from universal in the United States. Not only do increasing
numbers of post-divorce families exist under more than one roof, but in
some cultural groups in the U.S., co-residence is irrelevant unlike other
defining aspects of family.
By contrast, Justice Stevens in concurrence noted that enduring
family relationships may develop in unconventional settings, drawing
43
this conclusion from Stanley and Lehr.1 Justice Stevens preferred to
not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship
between a natural father and his child might exist. 144
Justice Brennan in dissent agreed with this aspect of Stevens' concurrence, but additionally agreed with a concern expressed by Justice
O'Connor's concurrence when he noted that the plurality opinion's exclusively historical analysis was a "departure from our prior cases and
145 According to Brennan,
from sound constitutional decision-making."'
the "plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border around
the Constitution."' 146 To the contrary, he argued, tradition is a malleable
concept. He did not reject the notion of investigating tradition in terms
of its guidance for the Court, but, he argued, Blackstone and others
should not form the limits of that investigation. He also argued that the
historical tradition underlying the right investigated is not that of "an
139 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
140 Justice Brennan, in dissent, criticizes Justice Scalia's insistence on focusing exclusively on history to the exclusion of consideration of whether the interest was implicit in
concepts of ordered liberty. Id. at 117. The "implicit in concepts of ordered liberty" language
derives from the Court's decision in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
141 Michael H., 491 U.S. at. n.3.
142 Id. at 123. Justice Brennan, in dissent, challenged Justice Scalia on this point, albeit in
a different way and for a different purpose. Justice Brennan exposes the supposed expansion
of protection from marital families to co-residing non-marital-but otherwise mirroring a marital family-families as mere lip-service. Id. at 143-45. Instead, according to Justice Brennan, the plurality opinion truly does place marriage as the crux of parental rights
determinations.
143 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J. concurring).
144 See id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id.
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adulterous parent" but of parenthood more generally. 14 7 Rejecting the
majority's suggestion that the Court's prior cases supported its "cramped
vision of the family,"' 14 8 Brennan provides a competing interpolation of
the court's prior cases such as Eisenstadt, Griswold and Stanley, which
he suggested support the view of parenthood as a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. Ultimately, suggesting that the world envisioned by the plurality was one of "make-believe" insofar as its
conclusion that Michael H. was not Victoria's father despite DNA tests
that confirmed that he was, the dissent concluded by lambasting the plurality's view that it is "tradition that alone supplies the details of the
liberty that the Constitution protects."
In one view, Michael H. might represent a loosening of the biological leash for adult/child kinship ties. That is, in Michael H. the Court can
be said to privilege a mere social parent 149 (a stepfather) over a biological (although also social) father. A different reading of that case, however, makes plain that the Supreme Court was not in fact privileging a
social parental relationship, but instead, promoting the marriage relation150
ship over a genetic parental one.
b.

Intimate Relationships Between Adults: The Fundamental
Right to Marry and to Private, Consensual Sexual Intimacy

In addition to circumscribing unmarried fathers' rights to parent
their children during the latter half of the 20th century, the Court also
addressed the scope of Constitutional protection for adult relationships.
Straddling the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, these decisions focused on the right to marry and the
right to private consensual sexual intimacy.151 As is true with the unmarried fathers' rights and later parenting cases, these cases reveal a Court
struggling to come to terms with a variety of family forms.

147 Id. at 139.
148 Id. at 157.

149 In anthropology, the terms pater and mater indicate social parents, while genitor and
genetrix indicate biological parents. PARKIN, supra note 6, at 14.

150 One might view the Court's work in Michael H., then, almost as a sort of social
engineering. The idea that marriage itself creates filiation (a parent-child relationship) is consistent with Navajo kinship tradition. See infra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
151 As is true in many of its kinship cases, in its right to marry cases the Court seems, at
some points, to ground its decision on one Constitutional provision or doctrine and, at different
moments, on another provision.
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Formal Legal Recognition of Adult Intimate Relationships:
The Right to Marry

52
Prior to the 1960s, and despite its strong rhetoric in Reynolds' and
53 about the importance of marriage to civilization, the
Maynard v. Hill'
Court had yet to rule that marriage itself was a fundamental right deserv1 54
ing of protection under the Constitution. It was in Loving v. Virginia155
that the Court arguably established marriage as a fundamental right.
In Loving, the Court held that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its analysis of the State's Equal Protection
Argument, the Court flatly rejected the State's purported purpose-to
"preserve racial integrity of its citizens, to prevent corruption of blood, a
mongrel breed of citizens, and the obliteration of racial pride." In
counter-point to the troubling language of the 1880s polygamy case of
Reynolds v. U.S.,' 56 the Court held that distinctions based on ancestry are
"odious to a free people... founded upon the doctrine of equality."' 157 A
race-based classification, such as an anti-miscegenation statute, thus categorically violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 8
The Court went further, however, and briefly addressed the case
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court held
that "[t]hese statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by

Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also discussion of Reynolds, supra at notes
55-62 and accompanying text.
153 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). See also discussion of Maynard, supra at notes
62-66 and accompanying text.
154 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
155 I say "arguably" because it is also possible to argue that Loving actually turns on
suspect class-race. Commentators, such as Pamela Karlan, for instance, suggest that the
Loving opinion relies upon an interweaving of both the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses. See Pamela Karlan, Loving Lawrence, supra note 53, at 1-2. A similar argument can
be made with respect to the Court's next marriage decision, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), discussed below, that the result in that case turned on the fact that the statute treated
the poor differently than the non-poor, as discussed in this section. Zablocki also used language that sounded like fundamental rights language with respect to marriage, but did not
directly say that the Court's immediately preceding marriage case-Loving--established marriage as a fundamental right. Subsequent cases, however, tend to refer to Loving as having
established marriage as a fundamental right independent of the race-based classification at play
in the case.
156 See discussion, supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
157 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. As discussed in the subsequent section, the depth to which
slavery intruded into marriages was substantial.
158 Id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
152
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free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental
to our very existence and survival." In terms of the Court's historical
discussion, at the time Loving was decided, there were 16 states which
prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial classifications. 159 At least with respect to those states that still had anti-miscegenation statutes, one could argue that the tradition of penalizing interracial marriage was of somewhat long-standing historical pedigree. According to the Court, "penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to
slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period."1 60
Thus, one interpretation of Loving, is that the Court overturned the statute despite both possible historical practices in accordance with its mandate, 161 and even then current practices and laws mirroring antimiscegenation practices. 162 On the other hand, thirty-four states never
enacted, or else had repealed their anti-miscegenation statutes at the time
the Court decided Loving. 163 If the Court's role is to rope in the minority
of states who insist on abiding by historical traditions now rejected by a
substantial majority of other states, 164 then Loving stands for the proposition not that the Court will counter majoritarian values, but that it will
look at the nation as a whole, in determining majority versus minority
opinions on fundamental rights issues. Arguably, this same approach
was at work in the Court's Lawrence v. Texas decision striking down
sodomy laws and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.

Loving arguably establishes the right to marry as fundamental.
However, an alternative interpretation of Loving would recharacterize it
as primarily an Equal Protection case, and contend that the Court's separate Due Process Clause analysis (finding that marriage is a liberty inter159 Id. at 6.
160 Id.

161 Id. ("Virginia is now one of 16 states which prohibit and punish marriages on the
basis of racial classifications. Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and
have been common in Virginia since the colonial period."). Note that Justice Scalia in
Michael H. rejected the notion that any of the Court's prior cases had recognized a longstanding tradition and then rejected it. Michael H., 491 U.S. at n.6.
162 See e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48 (discussing Loving: "Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th
century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected

against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.").
163 Loving, 388 U.S. at 6. Beyond the simple numbers of states who had such laws on the
books or had repealed such laws, it is important to keep in mind that there nonetheless may
still have been at work de facto, if not de jure, anti-miscegenation "laws." That is, it is not
much of a stretch to imagine that even in states who did not have or who had repealed their
anti-miscegenation statutes, inter-racial couples might have reasonably chosen not to marry
because of fear of violence should they attempt to do so. In that case, a particular state would
not have the need to enact a law preventing it, if prevention of inter-racial marriages was its
central goal. Personal communication with Dorothy Brown, October 2003.
164 See William Eskridge, Jr., Keynote Address, Brigham Young University Symposium
on The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Claims (August 29, 2003).
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est) cannot stand on its own without reference to the race-based statute at
issue. 165 The Court's own opinion suggests this might be the case, when
it explains its Due Process holding:
To deny this fundamental freedom [to marry] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied
in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of
the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens
of liberty without due process of law.... The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry
66
not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination.
As this passage from Loving suggests, one possible interpretation of the
decision is that race-based statutes may be sui generis in this regard: that
in its Due Process analysis of race-based statutes that impinge on an arguable liberty interest, prior and current practices and regulations related
to that asserted liberty interest cannot guide or constrain the Court's decision concerning them.
There is obviously a strong argument that race does indeed play a
unique role in Constitutional jurisprudence in the United States, such that
no other classification, be it gender, national origin, sexual orientation, or
other category warrants or should receive comparable Constitutional protection. The Court's own language, however, in its subsequent substan67
tive due process cases, and ultimately in its 2003 decision in Lawrence'
overturning Bowers, 168 suggests that other restrictions fall within the
same conceptual borders as the one at issue in Loving. These cases are
discussed at length below.
The Court's second right-to-marry case, Zablocki v. Redhail,169 decided over ten years after Loving, does take the fundamental right to
marry outside of a race-based context, although possibly leaving the right
still constrained by poverty-based parameters. In Zablocki, the Court
held that a state statute that requires court approval in order to marry
when the applicant is a non-custodial parent owing a support obligation
to his or her child violates the Due Process, and possibly Equal Protection, clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, economic status determined eligibility to enter into lawful
marriage. 170 Again echoing (and at times quoting) the flowery dicta of
165 Karlan, supra note 53.
166 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
167 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
168 478 U.S. 186 (1996).
169 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (1978).
170 Id. at 382. Although it asserted it was analyzing the case under both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, the majority don't seem to fully engage the equal protection
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its earliest family cases of Reynolds and Maynard v. Hill and its later
decisions in Loving and Griswold, among others, the Court held that:
"... the freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness ...[it is] fundamental to our very
existence and survival... the most important relation in
life . ..the foundation of family and society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress
. ..fundamental to survival of the race ...a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights... [and] intimate to
17 1
the degree of being sacred."'
Citing to its earlier substantive due process cases, the Court found
that the decision to marry is on the same level with other matters of
family life that it had previously held were protected liberty interests,
72
such as procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. 1
In so doing, the Court appears to have expanded the right to marry into a
protected liberty interest in a context other than where an invidious classification scheme exists, be it race-based or otherwise.
Notably, however, Justice Stevens' concurrence argued that the statute's classification scheme, which protected the wealthy while punishing
the poor, was an invidiously discriminatory classification. 173 It is this
notion-that a restriction on the right to marry which applies to one
group but not another-which undergirds the earlier suggestion that
Zablocki, like Loving, stands for the proposition that the right to marry is
a protected liberty interest, but only state interference that employs a
method that allocates that right differently with respect to some groups
than to others is unconstitutional.
Taking the Loving and Zablocki decisions together, then, one interpretation is that the right to marry does not stand on the same footing as
liberty interests found by the Court in some of its other substantive due
process decisions, such as procreation 174 or parental control of upbringing of children. 175 Nonetheless, the language employed in both the Loving and Zablocki cases reifies marriage, holding it up as the central
driving force (natural, legal and social) for civilization and the continuation of the species (at least of humankind in the United States). This
argument, but instead, rested its decision on the Due Process Clause. Only the concurrence
seems to have fully accepted the Equal Protection argument asserted by Mr. Redhail.

171 Id. at 383-84 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-386 (citing Loving v. Virginia, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Prince v. Massachusettes, Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska).
173 Id. at 404 (Stevens, J. concurring).

174 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
175 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
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valorization of marriage in these and the 19th century cases discussed
earlier, while perhaps commendable, is somewhat at odds with some of
the studies discussed in Part 111.176
(2)

The Legal Regulation of Adult Private Consensual Sexual
Intimacy

While reproductive rights are now understood as individual rights,
the Court's early privacy cases emphasized the right as a relational one,
inhering particularly in the marital relationship.' 77 In the Court's early
kinship cases of Reynolds and Maynard, as well as in its Griswold privacy case, and finally in Michael H., one uncovers the Court's particular
preference for a nuclear family structure, at times referred to as the "unitary family,"' 7 8 consisting of husband/father, wife/mother, and some col79
lection of biological or adopted children (whether actual or potential).
Further, the particular link between state-sanctioned marriage and Constitutional protection for families (those consisting of something more
than, or other than, simply a marital couple) most clearly emerges in
these cases which demonstrate the Court's privileging marital families
over non-marital ones. Both of these often-discussed aspects of the
Court's privacy cases' 80 find their counterpoint in a handful of the
Court's cases, discussed below, and in the studies of American kinship
discussed in Part III.
(3)

Moving Beyond Biology, Marital Status, or Both

In a series of cases addressing kinship ties other than those between
spouses or biological parents and their biological children, the Court has
adopted a more expansive definition of family. In some instances, the
Court has done so in dicta while ultimately sublimating the expanded
family to the biological one. In others, the Court in fact has granted the
protection to the non-biological or marital family. In a third set of cases,
the Court expanded its notion of kinship ties, when it addressed Constitutional questions surrounding adult intimate relationships.
176 See infra notes 237-334 and accompanying text.
177 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (grounding the right to access contraception in the marital relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to contraception inheres in the individual); Fineman, supra note 33, at 966-67, nn.31-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the shift from privacy as a relational right to an individual right
and citing to authors discussing same).
178 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 n.3.
179 Harlan's Poe dissent and his concurring opinion in Griswold plainly condition protection on the marital relationship.
180 For articles discussing the Supreme Court's narrow definition of family, see sources
discussed supra at note 33.
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Expanding and Contracting Rights between Adult Family
Members and Children

The Court faced questions about parent/child relationships in 1977
in the context of a non-nuclear, non-marital family-this time in the
form of a foster family-in Smith v. Organization of Foster Familiesfor
Equality and Reform. 18 1 In Smith, a class of foster parents challenged
New York's procedures for removing foster children from their homes.
The foster parents argued that they had a protected liberty interest entitling them to a hearing before removal. In support of this claim, the
foster parents pointed to the psychological bonds established between
foster parents and foster children, 82 and, relying upon the "psychological parent" theory developed by Anna Freud and her colleagues, 183 argued that these bonds established the foster family as a "psychological
family . . . [and] that family . . . has a [protected 14th Amendment]
184
'liberty interest' in its survival as a family."'
In Smith, the Court addressed directly the definition of family and
specifically the connection between biological ties and kin ties.' 85 The
Court phrased the question before it as follows: "[I]s the relation of foster
parent to foster child sufficiently akin to the concept of 'family' recognized in our precedents to merit similar protection?"' 8 6 In addressing
this question, the Court noted that children in foster placements often
lose contact with biological parents when placed in foster care, and that
187
they "often develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents."'
The Court further noted that although "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relationships, 188 . . . biological relationships are
not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family.' 89 The
Court also explained that "the importance of the familial relationship, to
the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association as well as
from the fact of blood relationship."' 190 As the Court admits, "[n]o one
would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the
181 431 U.S. 816 (1997).
182 See id. at 835-37.
183 Id. at 839 (citing JOSEPH
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
184 Id.

GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE

(1979)).

185 Id. at 843.
186 Id. at 842.
187 Id. at 836.
188 Id. 843 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
189 Smith, 431 U.S. at 843.
190 Id. at 844 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
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absence of a blood relationship."' 9' Clearly, adopted children and their
parents, at a minimum, require such an acknowledgement.
Thus, although ultimately the Smith Court concluded that foster parents' state-created contractual rights 92 lose out to the conflicting liberty
interests of biological parents, we see the Court flirting with a broader
notion of family. In so doing, the Court noted the possibility of children
developing deep ties with non-biological families (foster families) comparable to those in biological families, and further that foster families can
serve the same role as biological families in terms of socializing functions. This focus on the functions rather than forms of families encompasses a more expansive notion of family, similar to that adopted in

19 4
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,193 decided the same year as Smith.

In Moore, the Court adopted what is arguably its broadest definition
of family when it held that a zoning ordinance could not restrict cohabitation between grandparents and other relatives. The Court stated its rationale for this broader conception of family as follows:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving
of constitutional recognition ....

Even if conditions of

modem society have brought about a decline in extended
family households, they have not erased the accumulated
wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and
honored throughout our history, that supports a larger
95
conception of the family. 1
191 Id.
192 Id. at 845-46.

193 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The dissent in Bowers noted
that the Court should heed the warning of Moore and look at why certain rights associated with
the family have been accorded shelter, and then to protect those rights not because they tend to
directly or materially contribute to the general public welfare, but because, they form so central a part of an individual's life. We protect the decision whether to marry precisely because
marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut).
194 Moore actually was decided prior to Smith and is cited in the Smith decision itself.
195 Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."). See Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. at 843 n.49 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at
159) ("The scope of these rights extends beyond natural parents. The "parent" in Prince itself,
for example, was the child's aunt and legal custodian.").
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While the Court reached this unusual result, granting Constitutional protection to a non-nuclear family, it simultaneously reaffirmed its prior decisions that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."' 96 Thus, despite an apparent broadening of family
definition, the Court made clear that it still adhered to a central definition
of family as rooted in biology (blood), adoption, or marriage.1 97 However, in reaching its decision, the Court focused again on the functions
rather than forms of families, emphasizing economics, "mutual sustenance," and maintaining a "secure home life." 198
The Court's most recent iteration of Constitutional protections of
adult/child family relationships involved children's ties to grandparents
and tested the reach of Lehr and Michael H. in the context of children's
ties to their grandparents. In Troxel v. Granville,199 the Court held that a
Washington statute that allowed a family court to order visitation rights
for "any person" if "visitation serves the best interest of child" violated a
mother's substantive due process right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody and control of her children. Citing to its prior decisions on
parental decision-making authority and autonomy, the Troxel court held
that the primary role of parents was established as an "enduring American tradition" reflecting "western civilization concepts of the family as a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children."
On the other hand, the Troxel court did not hold that nonparental
visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment per se, noting that all 50 states have statutes that provide for
grandparent visitation. Thus, the Court appears influenced by social
practices, at least as they are embodied in current statutes in every state.
Further, in Troxel, Court was aware of demographic changes of the past
century, when it stated that these changes make it difficult to speak of the
"average" family and noted that nonparent visitation statutes recognize
2 °°
the changing realities of family.
196 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
197 Id. at 498 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)). Meyer,
supra note 15, at 808, 809 (noting the Court's adherence to the blood, adoption, or marriage
definition of family).
198 Moore, 431 U.S. at 505.
199 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
200 The dissent, by contrast, would have held the parent's rights are never absolute, but
tied to presence of embodiment of family, cautioning that the infinite variety of family relationships of ever-changing society counsel against creation of constitutional rule that treats a
biological parent's liberty interest as a right that may be exercised arbitrarily. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the dissent concluded, leaves room for states to consider
impact on child of possibly arbitrary parental decisions. The dissent would have held that the
right of parents to direct upbringing of their children is "unalienable." The dissent expressed
the concern that the majority was ushering in a new regime of judicially & federally prescribed
family law. The dissent's principal concern was that the holding reflected an assumption that
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Beyond Marriage: Recognition of Non-Marital Adult
Relationships

So far, we have been exploring what this Article refers to as the
Court's "kinship" cases. There is also another small group of cases that
do not strictly fall into that category, but that demonstrate the Court's
recognition of and extension of Constitutional protection to some aspects
of non-marital adult intimate relationships. These cases arguably support
the idea that the Court could (and sometimes does) focus on the functions
of relationships rather than their form or structure. For instance, in one
of its few cases protecting non-marital relationships, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird,20 faced with the issue of unmarried versus married people
obtaining contraceptives, held that a Massachusetts statute permitting
married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy but
prohibiting single persons from obtaining them for that purpose, violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court held
that with respect to contraceptives, the rights of unmarried persons
equaled those of married people. 20 2 Citing Stanley, the Court held that
the right of privacy includes the right of the individual, married or not, to
be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so funda20 3
mental as the decision to bear or beget a child.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 2°4 the Court was faced with the question of
whether over a decade of statutory and social change was sufficient to
warrant overturning the handful of remaining criminal sodomy statutes
proscribing consensual adult sexual conduct, as well as its prior privacy
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick which had upheld them. The Lawrence

court determined that it was. But further, the Lawrence majority revisited and rejected the prior description in Bowers of what were historical
legal practices with respect to regulation of sodomy. Lawrence may also
open the door (as Scalia noted in dissent) for expanding the right to government recognition of non-heterosexual adult intimate relationships.
The Lawrence court's more careful review of the deeper meaning and
import of earlier juridical and legislative pronouncements on sodomy
regulation which necessitated overruling Bowers v. Hardwick suggests a
court that is more willing to do more than superficially evaluate regulaparent(s) who resist visitation are a child's primary caregivers and that third parties have no
legitimate and established relationship with the child. Historically, the dissent notes, grandparents had no legal rights of visitation. Court-ordered visitation is a 20th century phenomenon,
and the obligation to visit grandparents is moral, not legal, according to the dissent.
201 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
202 Id. at 447. The Court rejected the State's purported purpose for the statute. The state
claimed this was a health measure, but the Court found that the real purpose to discourage
premarital sex. Id at 452.
203 Id. at 453.

204 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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tion of adult intimate relationships when it reviews the issue of government recognition and the social meaning of adult intimate relationships
in the context of the same-sex marriage debate.
3.

Conclusions: The Blood, Marriage, and Legal Adoption
Triumvirate Lingers?

As can be seen from the foregoing, on only the rarest of occasions
does the Supreme Court move away from the trio of definitional parameters of kinship: consanguinity (blood ties), marriage, and adoption. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court protects non-marital couples' right to contraception. In Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., the Court makes passing reference to
the bonds that non-biological foster families can establish. And at first
glance, the Court's Moore v. City of East Cleveland decision protecting
non-nuclear families' rights in the housing context might appear to take a
less constricted view of family than the other decisions discussed above.
Even in this apparently more broad-minded decision, the Court holds fast
to the rubric that only blood, marriage and adoption establish family
ties. 20 5 In contrast, the Court's regulation of adult non-marital intimate
relationships in Eisenstadt and Lawrence reveals a court willing to expand its notion of Constitutional protection of conduct within intimate
adult relationships that do not fit within the blood, marriage and adoption
triangle.
Some of the most puzzling of the Court's family cases-the point at
which the bite of Reynolds holding that marriage is the cornerstone of
society ultimately cuts most deep-are cases discussed above dealing
with unmarried fathers' rights. At its simplest level, the Court ultimately
holds in Michael H. that marriage trumps any biological or genetic connection between parent and child.
Several different conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing review. First, analysis of these cases reveals a consistent tendency by the
Court to employ conclusory statements-albeit perhaps sometimes accurate statements-about what is and is not part of our Nation's tradition
and history. 20 6 Resort to history to define the scope of a Constitutional
20 7
right is certainly neither necessarily unprincipled nor unprecedented.
U.S. at 498.
206 See infra Part II(A)(l) (discussing conclusory statements in the Court's kinship
opinions).
207 As discussed herein, the Court's substantive due process doctrine includes an historical component. See infra notes I I-12 and accompanying text. In addition, the Court's evaluation of a number of other Constitutional protections includes historical analysis, whether of
prior legal doctrine and legislation or of cultural and social practices. For instance, the Court
has looked to history in matters ranging from Indian sovereignty, see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 691, 695 (1990) (discussing a sixty-year trend towards Indian self-determination and its
impact on the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act); the history of parades in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568, 569
205 See Moore, 431
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However, the more careful historical, anthropological, and sociological
studies of kinship practices discussed in the subsequent section suggest
that neither historical nor present-day American kinship practices are so
easily described. 20 8 The point here is not that sociology or cultural anthropology is necessarily the best approach for the Court or even that the
Court is adequately equipped to evaluate this research, but rather that
these disciplines problematize the Court's broad-brush statements in its
kinship cases about the nature of American families. Determining what
is or is not "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition" or what
rights are "implicit in concepts of ordered liberty ' 20 9 when it comes to
families, might yield different conclusions depending on the sources
2 10
consulted.
Second, the conclusions reached by the Court in its kinship cases
often (but do not always) constitute a reification of historical practices
over current kinship practices. 21' To the extent that the Court has estabdue
lished a general doctrinal rule for limiting the scope of substantive
21 2
process to historical practices, it obviously yields this result.
(1995) (describing parades as "[plublic dramas of social relations" and modes of expression,
especially in cases involving protest marches); history of the Census in Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 322-324, 336, 341 (1999) (discussing
the decennial census "undercount" and the measures taken to correct it). Resort to other disciplines is not limited to history. The Court's inter-disciplinary research includes, inter alia,
psychiatry in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222, 223, 227, 231, 234 (1990) (referring
to psychiatric articles in discussing the necessity for a hearing prior to the administration of
psychiatric drugs to a mentally ill prisoner), and again in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2659 (1992) (citing to three psychological journals to support its decision that high school
students who dissent from religious exercises would suffer if forced to pray), and geology in
Amoco Production Co., Inc. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 871-73, 875-76
(1999) (discussing geological studies). See also, the now oft-discussed Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmeceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993) (discussing standards for expert
testimony), and Conley & Peterson, supra note 31, at 1183 (describing the FJC's manual in
response to Daubert).
208 See Part IIl(A)(2)(d) (discussing early South Carolina gentry); Part III(A)(2)(c)
(describing African American slaves' kinship practices).
209 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
210 See JOHN L. GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY 1-3. Gaddis alludes initially to
"history" as portrayed by historians, as a foggy landscape, inherently prone to indeterminacy.
Some would argue that this assumes an intellectual honesty on the part of the Court, that is,
"that [the Court] would care if 'tradition' could be more carefully constructed." Personal communication with Ron Krotoszynski, September 2004. As Professor Krotoszynski points out,
"the results may drive the reasons, rather than the other way around." Id. The Justices themselves disagree about whether statutory pronouncements should form the measure of historical
practices. Justice Scalia, in Michael H. endorses the legislative designation, while Justice
Brennan, dissenting in the same case, endorses a less "pinched" approach. Michael H., 491
U.S. at 125-26, 145.
211 One might characterize the Court's decision in Michael H. as such a case, given the
more recent development of DNA testing as being undercut by the Court's reference to historical protection of intact marriages.
212 See introduction to this section discussing the Court's use of history to limit the scope
of substantive due process.
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In two cases, however, Loving and Lawrence, the Court was faced
with the unique situation of a minority of states that rejected protection
for relationships that have a more complex social history and history of
legal regulation. In Loving, the Court specifically noted that the antimiscegenation statutes at issue had deep roots going back to the colonial
period. 2 13 At the time it decided Loving, however, the Court noted that
only sixteen states had anti-miscegenation statutes on the books, and that
fifteen years earlier, a total of thirty states had such provisions. 2 14 Simi213 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (anti-miscegenation laws "arose as an incident to
slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period").
214 Id. at n.5. The Court does not characterize this minority of states' views as a shift
in
social norms, because that was in fact not the case, at least within the states that still had antimiscegenation statutes. By contrast, in Lawrence, the Court faced an actual change in social
practices and beliefs as reflected in statutes concerning sodomy. In its earlier sodomy decision, Bowers, the Court noted that a majority of states had anti-sodomy statutes. 478 U.S. 186,
192-93. However, within the next ten years, most states repealed their statutes criminalizing
sodomy, such that when the Court next addressed the question of the constitutionality of
Texas' sodomy statute, only 13 states continued to have such prohibitions. See State v. Lawrence, 539 U.S.558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2474 (2003), and Brief Supporting Petition for Certiorari
on behalf of the defendants, at 9-10 and 23-26.
Even if the Supreme Court was right in its historical analysis in these cases, we have experienced several cultural and scientific changes since that time. For instance, the process of
legally determining paternity has radically altered over the past few decades, moving from
non-scientific trials in which juries must determine witness credibility as to sexual conduct that
might (or might not) have yielded offspring, to a purely scientific approach in the form of
DNA testing. Even the dissent in Michael H. noted this fact. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 156
(Brennan, J. dissenting). The phenomenon of relying on factors other than science to prove
procreative potential is not, unfortunately, without current support. As recently as 2003, a
prominent candidate being considered for a federal judgeship opined, in response to the plea
that abortion should be kept available for victims of rape, that conception from rape is an
extremely rare occurrence. His claim is unsupported by science, which clearly demonstrates
that the rate of conception from rape and consensual sexual intercourse are virtually identical.
Recently, the importance and sway of DNA testing has arisen in cases where fathers have
found out that the children they have raised are not their biological offspring. In one of such
cases, a Texas court ruled in a way that at best can be described as ambivalent; in that case, the
Texas court took custody away from and denied visitation with the 'father" while at the same
time it mandated he continue to financially support the children. See Tamar Lewin, In Genetic
Testing for Paternity, Law Often Lags Behind Science," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001 at Al.
These cases necessarily of course now come to the courts in part because of the advent of
DNA testing. But for the holding in Michael H., DNA testing would arguably give a genetic
parent increased status over a social parent.
In considering the role of DNA testing in legal definitions of kinship, however, we must keep
in mind that resort to DNA testing to determine the scope of protected relationships reflects a
culturally contingent choice. As anthropologist Robert Parkin explains, reliance on science in
the form of DNA tests itself reflects a culturally specific valuation of science, whereas in other
cultures, "different attitudes may prevail, and there may be no interest in ...scientific proof at
all, so that kinship becomes even more evidently a matter of social definition, of belief."
PARKIN, supra note 6, at 5-6. Ultimately, according to Parkin, "paternity, and kinship generally, remain matters of purely social definition." PARKIN, supra note 6, at 6. For instance, in
some cultures, the role of the divine in the production of offspring is seen as akin to that of a
biological parent, such that a child would have either three physical parents, or a mother and a
divine parent. See e.g. id. at 14. This is not necessarily anomalous or even that exotic: surrogacy arrangements yield more than two biological (if not genetic) parents. And further, recent
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larly, in Lawrence, the Court addressed the rapid transformation of legal
regulation of sodomy in the preceding decade and a half. In both Loving
and Lawrence, the Court declined to uphold historical practices evidenced in the state statutes at issue, and instead, used its authority to
bring Virginia and Texas into line with the majority of other states' enactments. Loving and Lawrence, thus, in one sense can be seen as normative rather than merely descriptive and reproductive of historical
practices. Further, in both Loving and Lawrence, we witness the Court
rejecting current practices reflected in some state statutes and adopting
more modem and broadly accepted social practices and beliefs. Relying
upon this particular approach-that the Court will corral outlier states
once state statutory trends are sufficiently demonstrated-has an important limitation: majority populations and practices must depend upon
majoritarian good will to achieve substantive due process protection. It
is my suggestion that in the context of determining the scope of protected
kinship structures, nuanced studies of both historical practices and substantial changes to those practices over time such as those of contemporary historians, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists discussed in the
following section, suggests a richness in American kinship practices not
revealed in most of the Court's kinship cases discussed above.
III.

VARIETY IN KINSHIP PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES

This Part presents a collection of studies by cultural anthropologists,
sociologists, and historians of American kinship. Because questions
about the nature of family relations form the core of anthropological kinship studies and of anthropology more generally, 21 5 this Part begins with
a brief discussion of anthropologists' understanding of kinship. It then
proceeds to describe the studies themselves to demonstrate the great variety of kinship patterns and beliefs in the United States; some of these
reveal a displacement of marriage from the center of some kin networks
while others do not. In the remainder of this section, the actual studies
are described and analyzed. This is not intended as a comprehensive
review of all sociological or anthropological studies of families in the
United States. 21 6 The studies discussed in this section represent a wide
scientific developments such as cloning or tri-gametic in vitro fertilization hint at the possibility of a child having two mothers, two fathers, and even greater than or fewer than two genetic
parents. See Kyle Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic
In Vitro Fertilization,7 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & LAW 431 (1999). Thus, biological
and even genetic parentage may differ from one cultural context to another both extraterritorially and within the United States itself. See PARKIN, supra note 6, at 14.
215 See supra Introductory paragraph to Part II.
216 Phyllis Chock, a cultural anthropologist who investigates the kinship practices of
Greek-Americans, works in the tradition of David Schneider. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note
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variety of cultural groups to demonstrate the wide variety of kinship
practices in the United States. They also highlight the different relationships that are emphasized in each cultural group. In addition, two of the
studies-namely that of the Navajo and of Japanese-Americans-were
chosen because they begin with, and subsequently draw upon the work
and intellectual tradition of the "genitor and social father" 2 17 of American kinship studies, David Schneider. This section, in part analyzes
these studies for their potential impact on the Court's kinship decisions
described in the previous section. As this section demonstrates, in some
cases, these studies might support the conclusions reached by the Court,
and in others, they would suggest a different result could have been
reached.
A.

ANTHROPOLOGY'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO THE COURT'S STRUGGLE OVER FAMILY
DEFINITION

According to anthropologists, kinship is "a system of rights and responsibilities between particular categories of people." '2 18 The basic concept of kinship refers not only to biological or legal connections between
people but also to "particular positions in a network of relationships."'2 19
Beyond this basic definition, however, there are actually two divergent
strands of thought within anthropology as to the content of the term "kin15, at 122; Chock finds that the spiritual bonds that develop in Greek-American cultural
groups can rank as important as biological and marital ties, and that they take on qualities
typically reserved to kin ties. See Phyllis Pease Chock, Time, Nature, and Spirit: A Symbolic
Analysis of Greek-American Spiritual Kinship, 1(1) AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 33 (Feb. 1974).
See also generally ROBERT PARKIN, KINSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC CONCEPTS 124-25
(1997) (describing the differences between pseudo-kinship, ritual or spiritual kinship, and fictive kinship.). For instance, a sexual relationship between those whose bond was spiritual,
such as between a godparent and a godchild, is considered taboo just as an incestuous relationship between parent and child, or between siblings, would be taboo in a traditional kin relationship. See Chock, supra at 33. To the extent that spiritual kinship of this variety reflects
practices such as incest, prohibitions typically restricted to blood and affinial ties that are
symbolic of these more traditional varieties of kinship, Shock's findings continue to force us to
broaden our notions of kin ties.
217 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 15. William Eskridge and others take a similar approach
in evaluating the legal regulation of sodomy. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9. David Chambers, in his presentation for a 2003 Brigham Young Symposium on the Future of Same-Sex
Marriage, urged that we consider this kind of evidence when we talk about what is and what is
not, when making claims related to the debate over same-sex marriage. I refer to Schneider as
the genitor father due to his seminal study of white urban American kinship. I refer to him as a
social father due to his mentorship of the many cultural anthropologists who have expanded
our knowledge of American kinship practices. For a discussion of the distinction between a
genitor and a social father, see infra notes 319-320 and accompanying text.
218 Anita Ilta Garey & Karen V. Hansen, Analyzing Familieswith a Feminist Sociological
Imagination, FAMILIES IN THE U.S. (2001). See also PARKIN, supra note 216 (describing the
concept of kinship); note 6 and accompanying text.
219 Garey & Hansen, supra note 218, at xviii.
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ship." In anthropological circles, kinship is viewed through either a biological or a cultural lens. Biology or genealogy-focused anthropologists
link kinship to the biological facts of copulation and reproduction.
Under this orientation, kinship is present in all human societies, meaning
that societies "all impose some privileged cultural order over the biological universals of sexual relations and continuous human reproduction
through birth."'220 A biology-focused anthropologist thus 22emphasizes
1 and sexgenealogy, parent/child relationships (filiation and descent),
ual conduct in different cultural contexts. By contrast, social or cultural
anthropology focuses on the particular social or cultural meanings or interpretations of these "biological universals" as they vary across cul-

tures. 222 For instance, in different cultural contexts, consanguinity and/
or sexual relations, in turn, might or might not be coterminous with mar223
and might or might not coincide with coriage-like (affinial) bonds,
224
residence.
Additionally, anthropological studies sometimes also distinguish between "social [or demographic] systems of kinship" and "cultural systems of kinship, while others-such as Yanagisako's on JapaneseAmerican kinship-insist that these two categories cannot be meaning-

fully separated. '22 5 To the extent that they are analytically if not practically severable, the former sociological! demographic depiction of
supra note 216, at 3.
See id. at 14-15. Filiation is not to be confused with "affiliation." Filiation specifibecally refers to the parent/child relationship, while "affiliation" refers to the relationship
approach
may
cultures
Different
16.
at
Id.
line.
descent
a
of
whole
the
and
tween one person
than
descent differently, emphasizing some links and not others or focusing on maternal rather
descent
ignore
may
even,
or
other),
the
of
expense
the
at
one
emphasizing
(thus
paternal links
Id.
altogether. Id. at 15. Some societies lump these lines into "descent groups" such as clans.
at 17.
bio222 Id. at 3. See generally Garey & Hansen, supra note 218, at xviii-xix (discussing
logical and affinial kinship links).
necessarily
223 PARKIN, supra note 216 (stating that blood-ties and sexual relations do not
220 PARKIN,
221

coexist with affinial bonds).
that core224 See, e.g. Parkin, supra note 216 at 19, 25-26 and Chapter 3 (explaining
sidence does not necessarily coexist with consanguinity or affinity).
225 SYLVIA JUNKO YANAGISAKO,
AMONG JAPANESE AMERICANS

TRANSFORMING THE PAST: TRADITION

AND

KINSHIP

13-17 (1985) (describing and critiquing Schneider's insistence

of her
on focusing on cultural kinship to the exclusion of social kinship). In an earlier iteration
thesis, Yanagisako starts from the perspective of Schneider's bifurcation of these two categories, but then uses her study to show the problems with such an approach. See Sylvia Junko
Yanagisako, Variance in American Kinship: Implicationsfor Cultural Analysis, 5(1) AMERIdescription of her reCAN ETHNOLOGIST 15, 16 (Feb, 1978). In her subsequent book-length
search, Yanagisako is explicit that her research includes both normative statements and
the present.
descriptive accounts of her study subject's actions in both the past and
e.g., Janet Dolgin, Choice,
YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra at 17. See also,
CONN.
Tradition and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the Ideology of the Family, 32
L. REV. 523, n.113 (2000) (describing Schneider as focusing on "the culture of American
families and not their demography"). My term "social kinship" would refer to demographics
the symand actual kinship practices. According to Dolgin, Schneider was "concerned with
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kinship consists of recounting actual kinship practices-in other words,
how people in the world "cope with the facts of human reproduction. '226
The latter cultural systems of kinship is, in a sense, a normative construct
insofar as it focuses on those aspects of kinship that seem to matter to the
227
study subjects.
More particularly, the cultural analysis of kinship involves deducing the cultural meanings of various kinship practices, regardless of
whether or not these aspects of kinship are reflected in how the study
subjects live their own lives. 2 28 The sociological/demographics of kinship most directly confronts the Court's statements that marriage in particular forms the central relation in U.S. kinship practices and thus forms
the focus of Constitutional analysis. 229 The latter, cultural kinship, dovetails more closely with some members of the Court's position that statutory enactments are the best measure of Constitutional protection since
they reflect majoritarian beliefs about what family and kinship relations
are important, and more particularly, what they normatively should look
like regardless of whether the prescriptive picture matches the actual descriptive one. Both social and cultural kinship are thus relevant to the
Court's statements that marriage in particular forms the central relation
in U.S. kinship practices, to the extent those statements are intended to
describe both actual practice, and beliefs about kinship whether or not
those beliefs are reflected in actual practice. 230
B.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES

This section begins with a discussion of Schneider's original study
of white urban middle-class Americans 2 3 I and his subsequent expansion
of that study to different socio-economic groups. 232 This section then
proceeds to evaluate the anthropological studies that built upon Schneider's work: 1) Witherspoon's study of Navajo kinship 233 and 2)
Yanagisako's study of Japanese American kinship.23 4 Yanagisako's
study is given more extensive treatment than the others, since she not
bols that defined families and with the family as a symbol. He did not suggest that
actual
families necessarily conformed to that model." Id. (citing SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at
1-6).
226 YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 15.

227 See YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 15-16; Dolgin,
supra

note 225, at n. 113.

228 See YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 19-20.

229 Reynolds, Maynard, and Griswold of course come to mind.
230 See Dolgin, supra note 225, at n. 113 (discussing David Schneider's work as other than
demographic).
231 See infra at Part HI(A)(I) (discussing the work of David Schneider).
232 See infra (discussing the expansion of his study to lower income white Americans).
233 See infra at Part IlI(A)(2)(a) (discussing the work of Gary Witherspoon).
234 See infra at Part lII(A)(2)(b) (discussing the work of anthropologist Sylvia
Yanagisako).
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only captures the impact of the "moment" of immigration on family
structures, but also the change in kinship patterns from first to second
generation immigrants. This section then discusses the work of sociologist Carol Stack on low-income urban and rural African-American communities, supplemented by a discussion of Peggy Cooper Davis'
explication of the impact of slavery on present-day African-American
families. 2 35 As an additional comparison, and for its particular insights
on historical kinship practices of one group of white Americans, this section briefly discusses Lorri Glover's236recent study of 19th century South
Carolinian elites' family structures.
The purpose of evaluating these studies is not to suggest that the
Court's decisions should turn upon the cultural or racial background of
particular litigants. Rather, engaging these studies demonstrates several
key points. First, these studies bring into question the universal accuracy
of the Court's insistence in both dicta and in its substantive support for
some of its decisions that marriage forms the central fundamental relationship of families in the United States. Second, these studies lend
credence to Justice Brennan's claim that Justice Scalia's vision of family
in Michael H. is "cramped." Third, as discussed in the preceding section,
there are questions as to the source of the Court's dicta and substantive
empirical claim as to the centrality of marriage in kinship practices in the
United States; the studies which contradict that empirical claim lend further support to the idea that the Justices are relying on their own sense of
what are traditional kinship practices and beliefs.
1. White Urban, Middle-Class and Lower Income Americans'
Kinship
For a significant period, "Western" anthropologists tended to study
only "non-Western" 237 societies' kinship structures. In the late 1960s,
David Schneider aimed the anthropological spyglass closer to home, and
See infra at Part III(A)(2)(c) (discussing the work of Carol Stack).
anthropo236 These studies call into question Professor Adolphe's claim to a monolithic
Adolphe,
Jane
See
marriages.
same-sex
denying
for
justification
her
thus
and
picture,
logical
The Case Against "Same-Sexed" Marriage in Canada: Legal and Policy Considerations,paper presented at B.Y.U. Symposium on the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Claims, Aug. 29,
2003.
opposed to "Occi237 For a critique of the categories "East" and "West" and "Oriental" as
dental," see Laura Nader, Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Control of Women, CULTURAL
Speaking: The
DYNAMICS 2:3, 323-355 (1989). See also Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively
"Honor" of the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West", 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287 (1997)
to
(examining the distinctions in criminal law in Eastern and Western societies on defenses
spousal murder); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002); James G.
Carrier, Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside Down, AMERICAN ETHNOLOoIST 19:2,
195-218 (1992) (discussing how anthropologists themselves have Occidentalized the West).
235
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studied American, non-Native kinship structures. 238 Developing the notion discussed above of a cultural analysis of kinship, Schneider interrogated the meanings of various kinship components to those in the group
he studied,2 39 ultimately rejecting the idea, embodied in biology/genealogy-focused kinship studies, that kinship was a cultural universal
grounded in reproduction (i.e., production of offspring and, relatedly,
consanguineal ties) and in reproductive copulation (i.e., sexual relations
for the purpose of reproduction and, relatedly, affinial ties). 240 Anthropological field work on American kinship practices following Schneider's original study exposes the complexity and cultural variation in
kinship structures and practices. It is this variation in kinship structures
that sits outside the margins of most of the Court's kinship cases. In the
Supreme Court, the standard (if not universal) 24' account of kin relation-

238 Schneider's focus was non-Native. Studies of the Navajo and other Native American
kinship practices had been undertaken by others prior to this time.
239 See C. Quince Hopkins, Variety in U.S. Kinship Practice: Substantive
Due Process
Analysis and the Right to Marry, 18 B.Y.U. PUB. L. REv. _ (2004) (forthcoming).
240 See Dwight W. Read, What is Kinship? in THE CULTURAL ANALYSIS
OF KINSHIP: THE
LEGACY OF DAVID M. SCHNEIDER 78, 78-80

(Richard Feinberg & Martin Ottenheimer, eds.
2001). Drawing on Schneider's work, Dwight W. Read argues that the only way to understand
kinship as anything other than a culturally specific and relative set of practices is to abstract
it
from the static "genealogical grid" and reconceptualize it as "terminological space." Id. at
81.
That is, we must look at the "set of kin terms" employed by any particular cultural group
as
structured system of symbols, id. at 80-81, and the features of these "terminological structures" "are explicable through the logic governing their generation as abstract structures
without reference to a genealogical grid." Id. at 81. Read does not reject the importance of
the

genealogical grid whole cloth, but rather argues that "the genealogical and terminological
spaces are co-existing conceptual structures with overlap arising through application of the
symbols from these two conceptual structures to the same domain of persons." Id. at 8 1. Read
suggests that the "linkage between the terminological space and a genealogical grid is elucidated by analytically mapping the terminological space onto the genealogical grid," which in
turn, "determines for each of the abstract symbols in the terminological structure its definition
as a class of associated kin types." Id. at 81. Although I discuss these ideas further in subsequent sections, it is not necessary to delve into these more nuanced ideas about kinship as a set
of symbols rather than practices and the concept of kinship as one abstracted from various
conceptions of kinship as reflected in these symbols, in order to see the more straightforward
critique suggested by the basic field work of both biology-focused and cultural anthropologists
over the past few decades. It is thus important to understand that this critique and the subsequent reemergence of kinship studies in the late 1990s interface with recognition that the
approach that the Court has taken to family and intimate relations protections is not just inconsistent with the nuances of then-existing anthropological research and understanding of kinship
(both within the U.S. and elsewhere), but also that anthropologists' understanding has been
radically altered by subsequent developments in that academic discipline.
241 One possible exception, discussed herein at Part II, is the Supreme Court's
privileging
a non-biological father-a step-parent--over a biological one in Michael H. 491 U.S. 110
(1989). Note, however, that Gerald D. (the non-biological father) receives protection because
of his marital relationship with the child's mother, and not because of his own direct (albeit
step-) relationship with the child. 491 U.S. at 119-20, 123 (discussing marital relation as
important to protect).
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ships is that "blood, ' 242 marriage, and court-sanctioned adoption ties
matter in terms of legal protection and oversight, while other links between people are something other than kinship, and so deserve little if
any legal protection. 243 Thus, for instance, while biological, physiological or genetic parents receive extensive protection in the law, "social
244
parents" rarely do.
The subjects of Schneider's original study were white, urban, mid245 In addle-class Americans residing in the Midwestern United States.
dition to noting the distinction between social and cultural kinship
systems, 246 Schneider came to several conclusions in his research. First,
Schneider emphasized that kinship systems were not just a set of cultural
practices, but more importantly, that those practices operate as a system
242 In Schneiderian terms, "blood" is not in fact the real connector; rather, it stands in as a
symbol of something else-a kinship tie. See infra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing Schneider's conception of blood as a symbol of kin ties); see also Dolgin, supra note 225,
at 542.
(discussing scope of legal protection of
243 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 498; infra at Part III
kinship relations). See also Meyer, Family Ties, supra note 15, at 809.
244 For a discussion of social versus genetic parents, see PARKIN, supra note 6, at 5-6.
This is the problem present in second parent adoptions by gays and lesbians, or just in ordinary
custody cases between separating gay or lesbian couples. Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000). However, a question remains: do blood ties flow through a generation? See infra at
Part II discussing these cases. Ironically, this legalistic and formalistic approach to kin structures, although originally (at least subliminally) informed by anthropologists' ideas of kinship,
ultimately triggered a nearly eviscerating critique of kinship studies in the field of anthropology. See Linda Stone, Introduction: Theoretical Implications of New Directions in Anthropological Kinship, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL KINSHIP 1-2 (Linda Stone, ed.
2001). Culminating with the work of feminist and queer theorists in the 1980s and early
1990s, traditional kinship studies faced radical, post-modem, and feminist critiques. See PARKIN, supra note 6, at ix (deconstruction of kinship notions exposing them as primarily culturally contingent, gendered, and ultimately phenomenologically non-existent). As a result of
this critique, some anthropologists viewed kinship as a viable area of study as essentially dead.
Interview with Sascha Goluboff, October 1999. These criticisms included arguments that traditional kinship studies' focus on marital and blood relations was Euro-centric in nature rather
than universal, was masculinist in that women focus on different aspects of social relations
other than merely sex and reproduction, and that it was an empty set for radical, feminist and
post-modem critiques--e.g., Schneider and Yanagisako. This post-modem movement in kinship studies continues to develop in the areas of queer theory. See, e.g., Judith Butler, ANTIGONE'S CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH (2000); Linda Stone, Preface to NEW

DIRECTIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL KINSHIP ix,

(suggesting one of the new directions has "to

do with debates over the relationship between biology and culture in kinship studies"). This
movement is further energized by the advent of new and improved reproductive and gender
reassignment technologies. See, e.g., EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 6, at ix. In addition, however, by the second half of the 1990s. a definite revival of more traditional kinship studies was
clearly underway, albeit substantially strengthened, deepened, and more nuanced as a result of
that critique. PARKIN, supra note 6, at ix-x. This kinship studies revival perhaps in part resulted from the deconstruction itself and the primarily Gay Lesbian Bisexual Transgendered
movement for recognition of alternative family structures and the development of new technologies of procreation.
245 See DAVID SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968).
246 See introductory discussion infra at Part I1.
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of symbols and need to be understood as such. 2 47 Based on the group he

studied, he determined that in American kinship, blood served as a symbol-a symbol of shared bio-genetic substance:
The biological elements in the definition of kinship have
the quality of symbols. That blood relatives share biogenetic substance is a symbol of unity, of oneness, and this
is symbolically interchangeable with the symbol of
love. .

.

.[B]iological unity is the symbol for all other

kinds of unity including, most importantly, that of rela24 8
tionships of enduring diffuse solidarity.
Second, Schneider identified as a central notion of American kinship,
this just cited concept of "enduring diffuse solidarity. ' 249 In coining this
phrase, Schneider more helpfully explained that this was "sociological
jargon for what Americans most usually refer to as 'love."' 250 Finally,
Schneider initially concluded from his research that marriage and reproduction, as expressed in the symbols of blood and reproductive sexual
intimacy, form the core of American kinship-of 'enduring, diffuse
25
solidarity." '

Twelve years after he published his study, however, his own research, as well as that of a number his doctoral students challenged his
conclusion that his informant group-that is, the subjects of his studycharacterized all American kinship practices. 25 2 In his 1980 coda to
American Kinship, Schneider acknowledged that one could not necessa247 Although the idea that cultural practices operate on a symbolic level was not new to
anthropology, it was typically limited to the realms of religion, myth, and comparable areas. It
was not until Schneider that this idea was extended to kinship systems. YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 13-14. Schneider emphasized the "culture of American
families [rather than] their demography." His primary concern was "with the symbols that
defined families" rather than concluding that "actual families necessarily conformed to that
model." Dolgin, supra note 225, at n. 113.
248 SCHNEIDER, supra note 245, at 107.
249 Id. at 52-53. The term "diffuse" refers to the fact that it "is not narrowly confined to a
specific goal or a specific kind of behavior." By "enduring," Schneider means that "two members of the family cannot be indifferent to one another, and since their cooperation does not a
have a specific goal or a specific limited time in mind, it is 'enduring.'" Id. "Solidarity"
means that "the relationship is supportive, helpful, and cooperative; it rests on trust and the
other can be trusted." Id.
250 See Dolgin, supra note 225, at n. 114 (citing SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHI', supra
note 245, at 50.
251 SCHNEIDER, supra note 245, at 50. Also see my critique of one legal academic's adoption of this earlier broad conclusion of David Schneider's without reference to Schneider's
subsequent caveat. Q. Hopkins, supra note 239, at n. 15 and accompanying text, referencing
David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the ConstitutionalDilemma of the Faultless Father,41
ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 810 (1999) (discussing David Meyer's reference to Schneider in support of
the idea that social norms map onto legal norms, but without Schneider's subsequent caveat
about its restriction to the group studied).
252 SCHNEIDER, supra note 245, at Chapter 7: Twelve Years Later, particularly at 121-22.
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rily extrapolate the conclusion of his earlier research on the centrality of
marriage and reproduction to American kinship practices and beliefs
from the subjects of his study-a homogenous white, urban, middle-class
American group-to other cultural groups even within the United
States. 253 As Schneider admitted, "[he] did make some very bad mistakes" in this central assumption of his first study.
Schneider explained that his own subsequent anthropological studies since his first study demonstrated that the meaning of "family" is
different for different class groups in the United States. 254 For instance,
his later studies revealed that the notion of co-residence as a critical symbol or marker of "family" is significantly lower in lower class families
than for middle class families, something echoed in Carol Stack's sociological study of lower income African-Amercans.2 5 5 This particular distinction directly brings into question Justice Scalia's emphasis in
Michael H. on "the household" which characterizes the "unitary
2 56
family.,
In this mea culpa, Schneider also noted that Sylvia Yanagisako and
others' work on immigrant communities further demonstrated the fallacy
of his original conclusion that ethnicity "does not matter. ' 257 The next
section thus first takes on two of the anthropological studies that expand
Schneider's original studies of white Americans' kinship systems to the
kinship systems of other cultural groups in the United States, one an
indigenous cultural group, and the second an immigrant cultural group.
The remainder of the studies discussed further expand our body of information about American kinship.
2.

Post-Schneider U.S. Kinship Studies

Anthropological kinship studies since David Schneider's seminal
work have expanded upon his findings in two significant ways, one critical and analytical, and the other substantive and descriptive. The analytical addition was Yanagisako's theoretical and methodological critique of
Schneider's separation of cultural from social kinship discussed at the
start of Part 111.258 The substantive addition was of course their expansion of the body of available descriptive accounts of kinship practices in
various "ethnic groups, social classes, and regions in the United
States. ' 259 The anthropologists who engaged in this task of exploring the
kinship practices of other cultural groups in the United States revealed in
supra note 245, at 121-23.
Id. at 122.
Id.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at n.3.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 245, at 122.
See discussion infra at the beginning of Part HI.
YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 10-11.

253 SCHNEIDER,
254
255
256
257
258
259
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their studies a number of interesting divergences in kinship beliefs and
practices between these different groups. 260 Sociologists such as Carol
Stack added to this body of information on U.S. families, although not
working directly within the Schneider tradition. The growing body of
historical research such as Lorri Glover's represents, also expands upon
Schneider's work, albeit indirectly, on the meanings of various kin-ties in
26 1
historical kinship practices in the United States.
a.

Navajo Kinship

Gary Witherspoon, a Schneider prot6g6, picked up the study of
American kinship, directing his attention to the kinship practices of the
Navajo. The Navajo are, in fact, one of the most studied cultural groups
in the United States, but Witherspoon's research employed Schneider's
method of a symbolic analysis of kinship, interrogating the meanings of
Navajo kinship practices.2 62 Unlike Yanagisako's research on Japanese
Americans, however, Witherspoon also thus stuck more closely to
Schneider's study of cultural kinship to the exclusion of social kinship.
Therefore, although his study reveals the normative f-amework of Navajo kinship-often derived from interpretations of Navajo myths-it
does not reveal actual kinship practices, much less whether these two are
in accord with each other. Finally, this focus on belief systems rather
than actual practices necessarily excludes a dissection of the impact of
formal and informal U.S. government policy on Navajo family structure
today. European colonization, forced migration and internment of the
260 Recall that Schneider himself focused more on the first (belief systems)-at least as a
belief system can be characterized as the same as meanings of symbols. In addition to refocusing the anthropological microscope onto other American sub-cultures, several subsequent
American anthropologists used Schneider's analytical emphasis on the "symbolic and meaningful structures underlying the normative and behavioral systems of kinship," see
YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 14, to analyze not static kinship
structures, but how kinship structures, practices and meanings change over time. Some of
these studies employ a true Schneiderian symbolic analysis of their subjects' kinship systems,
while others do not, but rather focus on the practices themselves. See YANAGISAKO,
TRANFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225, at 14 n.14. Sylvia Yanagisako's study of three
generations of Japanese Americans in Seattle, discussed in the final section, represents the
genre of those employing his symbolic kinship study.
261 See, e.g., LORRI GLOVER, ALL OUR RELATIONS: BLOOD TIES AND EMOTIONAL BONDS

AMONG THE EARLY SOUTH CAROLINA GENTRY (2000) (discussed herein at Part Ill(A)(2)(d)).
262 See GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE (1975). Although not Navajo himself, Witherspoon married a Navajo woman and lived on the Navajo Reservation. This
rendered him less of an outsider which facilitated his research. For this reason, his research on
Navajo kinship is one of the few studies to actually be cited with approval by the Navajo
Supreme Court. See Daniel L. Lowery, Developing A Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence:
The Navaho Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379, n.91 and accompanying text
(1993) (noting the Navajo court's historically distrust of studies of Navajos conducted by nonNavajos, but citing to Witherspoon's determination that a child traditionally is placed with the
mother upon divorce).
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Navajo people in 1864, mandatory placement of Navajo children in
boarding schools, and the pervasive practice of removing Navajo children for adoption into white homes, undoubtedly had a significant impact
263
on Navajo family structure.
What Witherspoon did reveal in his research was that within Navajo
kinship beliefs, the primary kin tie is that between mother and child,
rather than the one between spouses. 264 Marriage, defined as cohabitation and sexual intercourse, is significant, but it is considered a "weak
and insecure" relationship in contrast with the "strong and secure
mother-child relationship. '26 5 Further, one aspect of marriage that is
particularly significant that it establishes a tie between father and
child.2 66 That is, a father's kin relationship runs through the child's
mother and attaches to the father by virtue of the father's marriage to the
mother, rather than flowing directly from father to child. Should the
marriage end, 267 the father's kinship relationship to his child is severed
268

as well.

To the extent that one might translate Navajo kinship beliefs to
other contexts (again, not the primary thrust of this analysis) this kind of
kinship structure, would, in one view, accord with the Supreme Court's
holding in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 269 That is, the Michael H. plurality
determined that when a child is born to a woman during her marriage to a
man not the child's father, the non-marital but biological father's relationship to his biological child is preempted by the marital relationship
between the marital but non-biological father and the child's biological
mother. 270 In this way, the "father" of the child in Michael H. is the
27
person who is married to her mother. '
263 On all but the issue of adoption practices, see Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for
Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 17-20 (1999)
(describing these events and their impact on Navajo family structure, particularly U.S. policies
that centered male authority in the family in contrast with traditional Navajo social systems).
For a discussion of adoption, see generally, Rebecca L. Miles, Bootless Cries: Asking a Federal Court to Re-Examine a State Court's Application of ICWA Under 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
264 WITHERSPOON, supra note 262, at 21, and 30-31.
265 Id. at 28.
266 Id. at Chapter 5, Father and Child, particularly at 34-35.
267 Witherspoon notes the traditional Navajo method of divorcing is for the wife to place
the husband's personal belongings on the doorstep of their dwelling. Id. at 75. Contemporary
Navajo divorce practices in tribal court are similar to, although not identical with, Anglo divorce practice.
268 Id. at 30-31 ("[l]t is the marriage of the father to the mother which ties the father to
his children. When the marriage is dissolved, the father-child relationship is behaviorally and
functionally dissolved, or almost so.").
269 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
270 Id. at 129.
271 Interestingly, the Navajo

Supreme Court, when faced with a custodial claim by a nonNavajo Native American mother against a Navajo father, sidestepped its own kinship tradition
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Japanese American Kinship

Sylvia Yanagisako, also a Schneider protegee, 272 drew upon his
work in her research on Japanese Americans' kinship structures. 273 For
purposes of our discussion, two aspects of her findings are particularly
critical, the first related to the scope of who her study subjects view as
kin and the second being her major contribution to the field of kinship
studies: the process of kinship change.
First, Yanagisako found that the kinship ties in Japanese American
families are particularly broad. For instance, one's sibling's in-laws are
considered family, despite the complete lack of actual blood or affinial
tie, as are one's sibling's spouse's siblings (otherwise known as one's
consanguine's affine's consanguines). 274 Further, in looking at the practice of koden (the exchange of mortuary offerings), Yanagisako found
that friends and acquaintances not related by blood or marriage, even in
the most attenuated form, take on aspects of kin relations through the
system of koden obligation.2 75 The Japanese American conception of
family, therefore, exists beyond even what the Court recognized as important familial ties in both Moore v. City of East Cleveland276 and recently in Troxel v. Granville.277 This conception of kinship further
separates notions of kinship from purely biological or affinial ties. 278
Again, the point is not that Japanese American kinship norms specifically should guide the Court, or that the cultural or racial background of
the parties should drive the result in a particular case. Rather, these cultural kinship practices suggest that the Court's move in Moore away
from narrow definitions of family finds some justification in actual kinship practices of some cultural groups in the United States.
The second critical addition from Yanagisako's research for the critique of the Court's rooting of Constitutional protection in historical tradition is a picture of kinship change over time, not just from generation
of preference for mother/child bond and of fathers losing kin ties to their children upon divorce, by asserting a different "cultural kinship" tradition that the Court determined overrode
it. This different tradition was one which recognized a child's ties to the full tribal community.
Awarding custody of the child to the non-Navajo mother would thus sever these traditionally
recognized kinship ties between child and community, a result the Navajo Supreme Court
would not countenance. See Atwood, supra note 233, at 611-12.
272 See, e.g., NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL ANALYSIS (IX)
(1995).
273 See YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 225,

at

13-20.

274 See Yanagisako, Variance in American Kinship, supra note 225, at 17.
275 Id. at 18-21.
276 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
277 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
278 See discussion of Yanagisako, Variance in American Kinship, supra note 225, at 17
(describing the application of the term "relative" to those not in fact related by biology or

affinity).
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to generation, but also within one generation. 279 This aspect of her research is particularly useful since it largely (although not entirely) focuses on the changing practices and beliefs about marriage itself within
cultural groups.
Yanagisako's research focuses on first generation (Issei) and second
generation (Nisei) Japanese Americans. The Issei in her study present a
set of factors that likely were part of a number of first generation American cultural groups, whether they immigrated in the 1700s or at the turn
of the 20th century, as had the Issei. Most early Japanese Americans
were men who "planned to return home" and thus maintained close kin
ties to those who either came with them but returned to Japan, or who
had remained in their natal country.28 0 Issei marriages, thus, "were from
the beginning embedded in families that crossed national boundaries,"
and family in their natal countries retained significant involvement in the
arrangement and oversight of those marriages as was typical of non-emi28
grant Japanese marriages generally. '
The dynamics of Issei marriages derived in part from the Japanese
system of primogeniture. The position a man or woman occupied in the
sibling hierarchy thus affected the nature of their marriage in terms of
input into who they could marry, where they would live, and what the
internal power dynamic in the relationship might be. 282 In families
where the only child was a daughter, for instance, the family might arrange for her to marry a suitable man and then adopt that man as the
successor to the family fortune. He, in turn, would take his wife's family
name as his own and join her family's household (i.e., live uxorilocally).2 8 3 Women who married first-born sons, by contrast, would join
their husband's family's household (i.e., live virilocally).2 84 The notion
of "joining" the proper household of course was significantly complicated when dealing with cross-national families. This supports the view
of the plurality in Michael H. that inheritance rules often undergird rules
about marriage (or in that case, a presumption about legitimacy). On the
other hand, as the particular system of inheritance shifts (or family economy in general shifts) as it does with second generation Japanese Americans, the kinship and marriage models shift as well.
The Nisei, the children of the Issei, faced a different set of cultural
factors and political events that impacted their practice and understanding of marriage. As a broad-brush matter, the two generations differed in
279 YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST,
280

Id. at 27-29.

281

Id. at 29-30.

282

Id. at 35-41, 48-62.
Id. at 36 and n.5.
Id. at 39.

283
284

supra note 225, at 63.
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terms of 1) mean age of marriage-the Nisei tended to marry later; 2)
ultimate family size-Nisei families tended to be smaller; 3) educational
level-the Nisei tended to have more formal education; and 4) their
spouses occupations-the Issei were predominantly self-employed entre285
preneurs while the Nisei tended to be salaried employees.
Beyond these generalizations, Yanagisako further broke out the Nisei into four discrete "cohorts" that demonstrated intra-generational differences with respect to the practice and meaning of marriage. A
"cohort" is an "aggregate of individuals ...who experience the same

event within the same time interval. '286 In Yanagisako's study, the relevant historical periods and events for the Nisei were the pre-World War
II period (1926-1940), the War period (1941-1945), the resettlement period (1946-1955), and the post-resettlement period (1956-1970).287
Pre-war Nisei marriages were impacted by continuing control of economic resources by their parents, who, as a result, continued to control
marriage itself.288 By the end of the prewar era, however, marriages in-

creasingly were "the result of Nisei-initiated courtship.

'2 89

That said,

dating outside of the Japanese American community was considered unacceptable. 290 Thus, the shift from traditional Japanese marriage to the
white American model (as defined by the Issei and Nisei) was affected
not by marriages to non-Japanese, but by other factors.
The advent of World War II, the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the
internment of Japanese Americans in prison camps beginning in 1942
"altered irrevocably the community and its familial structure."12 9 1 The
Issei were deprived of their businesses and thereby of one form of control over the marriages of their children. With no property to inherit, the
system of primogeniture no longer played the controlling role that it had
for Issei marriages. 292 As was true with relocation of the Navajo, U.S.
government policies served to disrupt the Issei's political leadership and
supplant it with Nisei autonomy. 293 This shift in control and the internment process itself, which exposed the Nisei to a larger pool of potential
spouses, corresponded with an increase in Nisei marriages during this
period.2 94 Shortly after the war ended, and during the resettlement pe29 5
riod, marriages to non-Japanese spouses also began to increase.
285 Id. at 63-64.
286 Id. at 66.
287 Id. at 67-82.
288 Id. at 67-69.
289 Id. at 69.
290 Id. at 70.
291 Id. at 73.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 74.
295 Id. at 76.
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During the post-resettlement period, with the Nisei firmly ensconced in positions of social power, the Japanese American community
"took on the familistic tenor that pervaded American Society in general ....,,296 At the same time, for younger Nisei who were just reaching
marrying age, parental involvement in marriage arrangement and wedding plans resurged. This resurgence enhanced the tie between younger
Nisei and their Issei parents than was the case between older Nisei and
their parents. 29 7 Despite these variations, Yanagisako notes that the Nisei nonetheless cohere as a generation by virtue of the fact that the four
passage of years, incohorts converged into common patterns after the
298
cluding shared normative and cultural systems.
The advent of World War II and related events correlated with a
major shift in the circumstances of marriage between the generations:
From Issei to Nisei ...much more changed than the way

in which spouses were selected. That Nisei husbands
and wives no longer worked together in family businesses. . .this, in social import if not emotional drama,
equaled the shift from arranged marriage to romantic
marriage. The employment patterns of wives over time,
the conjugal division of labor.. ., and the power relations
of husbands and wives all differentiate the Nisei from
their parents.
Yanagisako notes several key important differences in the culturalmeaning of marriage as a social institution to the Issei as opposed to the Nisei.
In general, the shift from the Issei to post-resettlement Nisei comprised
the distinct move away from traditional Japanese marriage norms
grounded in notions of duty towards what both generations characterize
as the white American marriage model grounded in notions of romantic
love noted in the foregoing quote. 299 For the Issei, marriage was fundamentally an institution of giri or duty, "enmeshed within a web of obligations and responsibilities to kin and community and love was relatively
less important. ' '3°° For Issei women, in fact, the death of their spouse
' 30
was "associated with release from life's greatest burdens." '
Nisei marriages, by contrast, moved closer to romantic and egalitarian marriages, although the Nisei emphatically view them as a distinctly
unique hybrid-as Japanese American rather than purely Japanese or
296 Id. at 79.
297 Id. at 80.

at 87.
299 Id. at 121-22, 105 n.2, 107 n.3.
298 Id.

300 Id. at 96.
301 Id. at 97.
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purely American. 30 2 The Nisei view their marriages as a balance between "the all-too-whimsical and dangerously unstable American marriage and the emotionally ungratifying and often burdensome Japanese
marriage. '30 3 Nisei relationships thus aim to incorporate love and affection, but also maintain the traditional Japanese notions of duty, commitment, and self-discipline. 30 4 These differences in meaning of marriage
demonstrate the importance of avoiding simplistic statements about
what marriage is or does within any given cultural group such as the
Court espouses in Reynolds, Maynard, Griswold, and some of its parental rights cases.
One further critical difference between the Issei and the Nisei sheds
light on the Court's parent-child and adult intimate relationships cases
and it relates to the differential emphasis that each generation places on
particular relationships within their kinship network. That is, the Nisei at
first appear to emphasize the priority of the conjugal relationship over
the parent-child relationship, and a type of marriage that is "the most
intimate, solidary, and enduring bond in a person's life." 30 5 To the Nisei,
their parents' type of marriage, with its "Japanese" hierarchy of relationships placed an unhealthy priority on the parent-child relationship. 30 6
Thus, at first take, for the Nisei, the married couple appears to be the
"core of the family. '30 7 For the Nisei, "the love and unity manifested
in
their relationship are what shape the other relationships in the family. It
is indeed the determining relationship, the one that "makes the family."' 30 8 Yanagisako notes, however, that the Nisei's views are actually
"more complex and ambivalent than these responses might seem to
indicate." 30 9 In fact, when Nisei focus upon the marriages of their own children (the Sensei), they are "often critical of what they perceive to be an
inordinate emphasis on the conjugal bond to the detriment of the parentchild bond. Thus, for second generation Japanese Americans, there exists a tension between the family relationships that vie for primacy in
their kinship structure.
This study of Japanese American kinship reveals several key points
related to the Court's analysis of protected kinship structures. First,
Yanagisako's research on the Issei demonstrates an immediate impact
from immigration itself on kinship structures. This suggests that reliance
302 Id. at
303 Id. at
304 Id. at
305 Id. at

107.
108.
108-09.

109-10. In Yanagisako's view, this places them squarely in their category of

"American marriage."
306 Id. at 109-10.
307 Id. at 110.
308 Id. at 110.
309 Id. at 111.
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by the Supreme Court on the practices and legal protections of kinship
structures to determine history and tradition should perhaps be limited to
post-immigration "tradition." As a country made up of almost entirely
immigrant populations, this significantly problematizes Justice Scalia's
particular valuation of early English legal theoreticians in determining
kinship traditions for the bulk of U.S. families. For the remainder (Native Americans), it of course goes without saying that English kinship
protections would be irrelevant to how they structured their families prior
to colonization.
Second, the differences Yanagisako uncovers between first and secimmigrant communities tell us that the meanings of pargeneration
ond
ticular cultural kinship practices such as marriage do change over time,
both from generation to generation and within a given generation. If
kinship practices and beliefs change, then tying Constitutional protection
to historical kinship practices seems nonsensical.
Third, the complexities of meanings attributed to particular cultural
practices by any given cultural group (in this case the Nisei's views of
marriage) suggest that legislative enactments might well not be an accurate or even the best measure of normative views of kinship. That is,
legislative enactments by nature tend to gloss over subtle differences of
the sort Yanagisako's study reveals in the Nisei conception of marriage
as both a blend of historical notions of duty and modem notions of romantic love, and as centering marriage and then de-centering it by reinstating the importance of the parent-child bond.
c.

African-American Kinship

Sociologist Carol Stack investigates present-day rural and urban African-Americans' kinship networks in her work. Unlike other researchers, Stack's particular focus is on a particular socio-economic group
within the larger cultural group of African-Americans. 3 10
Within the group she studied-lower-income African-AmericansStack identifies extended care-giving networks for children that are
sometimes, but not always linked by biological, genetic, or marital
ties. 3 11 Particularly from the perspective of the children, Stack noted that
"there may be a number of women who act as "mothers" toward
them. ' 31 2 Similarly, "[a] woman who intermittently raises a sister's or a
niece's or a cousin's child regards their offspring as much her grandchildren as children born to her own son and daughter. ' 31 3 Others have repli310 CAROL

B.

STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY

(1975).
311
312
313

Id. at 62-89.
Id. at 63.
Id.
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cated Stack's finding on this point-notably Herbert Gutman, who
describes conceptions of quasi-and non-kin social obligations where children (including fictive-i.e., non-biological or adopted-ones) are cared
for by a network of surrogate caregivers of friends and extended family
3 14
members.
To a certain extent, these patterns of caregiving and subsequent acknowledgement of the kinship ties that derive from that caregiving dovetail with the Lehr Court's emphasis that parent-like behavior was
relevant in determining Constitutional protection. If one looks at the plurality's holding in Michael H. v. Gerald D., however, and its conception
of parent-child rights flowing from the baseline institution of marriage,
Stack's research directly conflicts with that holding. Stack demonstrates
that these bonds between children and extended family in lower-income
African-Americans in practice have little if anything to do with some
pre-existing marital tie. By placing marriage at the center of family-related rights, as the Court does in Michael H., it insures displacement of
these particular kinship care networks outside the scope of Constitutional
protection. These extended care-giving networks also suggest a revisiting of the Court's cases in the foster care setting, most notably Smith v.
O.F.F.E.R., that ultimately privilege blood connections over fostering
ones. By contrast, her research supports the Court's holding in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland that extended protection to a family that appears
to have more closely resembled the care-giving structure that exists in
Stack's study. Finally, not only would the bulk of the Court's kinship
cases not recognize these extended kin and kin-like ties, neither would
some acts of Congress, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA). 3 15 The FMLA would deny benefits and protection for these
types of family structures, and thus grossly favor their white counterparts-lower income whites, who are more likely to use affinial and bio3 16
logical relatives as caregivers.
Replicating Schneider's revelation that socio-economic status matters to kinship practices, Stack also reveals that co-residence is not necessarily a marker of family ties within low-income African-American
cultural groups. 3 17 As discussed in connection with Schneider's work,
Justice Scalia's reference in Michael H. to the "household" of "unitary
supra note 55, at 92 (citing Herbert Gutman).
315 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
316 Orlando Patterson, in RrrUALs OF BLOOD, notes that this phenomenon today directly
results from the profound impact of slavery on present-day African-American families, and, in
particular, impacts African-American men's role in families. ORLANDO PATrERSON, RITUALS
OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES (1998). Is the fact that
family structure in present-day African-American families is a remaining construct of slavery a
reason to discount its legitimacy or factual existence today? Certainly the answer must be no.
317 Stack, supra note 310, 62-67, 115-17.
314 DAVIS,
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families," Stack's research confirms the socio-economic specificity of
such an emphasis on co-residence. In addition, instruments such as the
United States Census, would thus exclude from its results a large number
families as not
of functioning rural and urban poor African-American
31 8
family.
of
definition
narrow
its
falling within
Finally, Stack's research exposes several additional particular kinship elements of her African-American informants' group. First, Stack
notes distinctions between types of fathers. Her study subjects distinguish between 1) the "genitor" father who biologically fathered the child;
2) the "pater" or "essential kin," typically referred to as "daddy"-the
man who in fact raises the child; and 3) the "jural" or "socially recognized genitor father" who would be a father that not only sired the child
but who also has played some additional role beyond just the act of conception. 319 These kinds of distinctions map somewhat roughly onto the
social versus legal parent ideas at play in the Court's unmarried fathers'
rights cases. Michael H., for instance, would likely be a "socially recognized genitor father," at least until the plurality got hold of him, whereas
the father in Lehr v. Robertson would be a genitor rather than a jural
father. These complex ideas of multiple types of fathers, just as is true
with children's sense of multiple mothers, further problematize Justice
Scalia's claim that "California law, like nature itself makes no provision
'320
for dual fatherhood.
Stack also identifies a kinship practice in this cultural group where a
father's tie to his natal family is particularly strong, sometimes enough to
override his tie to his biological children. This particular strength of natal family ties would yield a different focus if the Court adopted it. That
is, a focus on a child's powerful tie to his or her natal family undercuts
the notion that the marital bond is paramount. It also would suggest a
clearer protection for children's rights (as opposed to children's rights as
derivative of parents' rights), and thus a broader protection for a child's
ties to multiple kin units. This latter conception would also again contradict the holding in Michael H., that a child could have more than one
"father." Finally, Stack's research reveals that a mother's tie is some32 1 In this
times stronger to her latter-born children than to her first-born.
structure of kin ties, an aunt or grandparent often takes on a social parent
role. 322 The regularity of this practice thus might suggest a sufficiently

318 See discussion of the U.S. Census and the FMLA in the Conclusion, infra at 497.
319 Id. at 45 and n. I.
320 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
321 See, e.g., STACK, supra note 5, at 46-49.
322 Id.
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strong traditional practice that it should warrant Fourteenth Amendment
323
protection.
Any discussion of present-day African-American kinship must take
account of the impact of slavery and its legacy on these kinship practices
and meanings. 324 Peggy Cooper Davis, in her thoughtful and revealing
text, Neglected Stories: The Constitution and Family Values, 32 5 presents
a number of stories of kinship ties, primarily parent-child and husbandwife, that enslaved men, women, and children established despite slavery
and legal bans on those ties. The people she describes function as families and create de facto spousal relationships. 326 Husbands and wives
maintain lifelong commitments to each other even after they have been
"trafficked" away from each other by the enslavers. 3 27 Davis also describes a second way some men and women dealt with separation because of sale by adopting a form of polyandry or polygamy. These
separated spouses recognized that they were possibly never going to see
each other again, so "marrying" a second spouse would take place, although not with a simultaneous repudiation of the first "marriage. '328
Davis' point, in large part, is that we need to take account of these multiple and different stories of slave kin ties and practices. In particular,
however, her work suggests that the Court's, particularly Justice Scalia's,
emphasis on legal proscriptions and permissions is misguided.
Further, Davis exposes how the meaning of marriage was significantly different for enslaved people than those who enslaved them. That
is, marriage to enslaved African-Americans was a symbol of something
much more than just a lifelong commitment to another person. In antislavery rhetoric, people viewed marriage as a symbol of freedom, citizenship, and humanity. 329 These historical accounts and meanings un323 Again, these variations in kinship practice also suggest possible disparate treatment
under Congressional acts such as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601 et seq., or the United States Census.
324 For other discussions of the impact of slavery on African-American kinship, see, e.g.,
L. GLOVER, supra note 261, at Introduction; Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, II YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 251
(1999); Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); PAT-rERSON, supra note 316; Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1299-1300, 1324-43 (1998).
325 DAVIS, supra note 55 (arguing slave and anti-slavery narratives suggest another way
of looking at family rights protections.).
326 Id. at 132.
327 Id. at 37.

328 Davis suggests that this is possibly an extension of African polygamy and not merely a
construct resulting from the institution of slavery. Id. at 62-63.
329 Id. at 35. Note that elements of the post-slavery pro-marriage debate smacked loudly
of racism: marriage (and parenting) were talked of as rights on the one hand, but also, talked
of as a way of controlling or "civilizing" newly freed blacks, by avoiding the situation of
newly freed slave women and children from becoming public charges. Id. at 39-40. See also
A. Davis, supra note 324. This debate presaged racist overtones of later welfare debates and
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doubtedly reverberate in the accounts of present-day African-American
330
kinship practices.
Finally, that the conclusion of the Court in Reynolds, still so close to
and infected by the system of slavery, which had been formally (if not
actually) dismantled by the Emancipation Proclamation just fifteen years
earlier, 3 3 ' continues to reverberate in its kinship cases today is troubling
at best. In addition, however, if the test of protected kinship practices is
whether they are part of the historical fabric of our Nation, we should at
this point be intellectually able to revisit the Reynolds' Court's conclusion as to the factual realities of marital relationships at the time that case
was decided, and thus all of the cases decided since that time that have
relied upon the Reynolds dicta, at least insofar as recognizing possible
different kinship practices then taking place. In addition, in our assessment of the validity of Reynolds, it would also be consistent with reanalysis of both then-existing kinship practices that the Court take account of the devastating impact that slavery itself has had on AfricanAmerican kinship relations. As (if not more) important, however, is that,
in assessing variances between some present day African-American kinship structures and those of Anglo, middle-class, urban and suburban
Americans, the Court should be extremely hesitant to conclude that the
latter takes precedence over the former without regard for the fact that
some present day African-Americans' kinship relationships cannot be
neatly excised from and examined in isolation from the institution of
332
slavery and its legacy.
d.

Kinship Bonds of Early South Carolinian Gentry

Although the prior anthropological and sociological studies focus on
modern day kinship practices, it is also the case that historical practices
are more complex than the Court's cases would suggest, as evidenced by
the foregoing discussion of slave-marriages and other kinship ties between enslaved African-Americans. The recent historical research of
Lorri Glover on the kinship bonds of early South Carolina slaveholding
gentry during the century and a half prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment presents another example of a more nuanced description of historical kinship ties-an understanding of kinship ties different
debates about tax policy and law. See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First
Century, What's Tax Policy Got to Do With It? 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 759 (1999).
330 See generally, PATTERSON, supra note 316.
331 See NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY DESK REFERENCE 814 (2d ed., 1993).
332 See generally DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 55; see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES (1998).
And see discussion of Carol Stack's present day studies of African-American kinship structures, infra at Part III(A)(2)(c). Of course, the "easy" or at least transparent answer might be
that under current doctrine only white, Protestant families get to define tradition.
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from that discussed by the Court, and one where marriage and parentchild relations do not necessarily form the core kin tie.
In her research, Glover finds that brothers, sisters and the extended
family formed the foundation on which South Carolina gentry built their
emotional, social, and economic worlds. 333 As Glovers editors describe
it, "adopting a cooperative, interdependent attitude, and paying little attention to [otherwise then prevalent] gendered notions of power, siblings
served one another as surrogate parents, mentors, friends, confidants, and
life-long allies. 'Elitewomen and men' simultaneously used those sib'334
ling ties to advance their interests at the expense of unrelated rivals.
Marriage ties existed, to be sure, but they operated almost as wallpaperthey were in the background, but were not central to the lives of these
people. It was a similar situation with parent-child ties: they existed, but
ultimately, the sibling bond overrode the inter-generational bond in
importance.
Glover's research on early South Carolina gentry thus challenges
deeply held assumptions about United States families, at least white,
propertied families, in the eighteenth century. In particular, her work
undercuts the Supreme Court's often-repeated tenet that marriage historically and traditionally formed the central and fundamental core of family
structure in the Untied States. That is, to the extent that the Court's rationale for privileging the kinship norms of white Americans as they were
practiced at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Glover's
research suggests that the Court's assumptions of what those norms and
practices were may well not be empirically sound. On the other hand,
Glover's research does suggest that the genetic tie between siblings does
play a central role in the lives of early slaveholding South Carolinians.
Her research thus further suggests that protection of those sibling bonds,
such as in a case that might present questions of a child's interest in
sibling adoption or in a split custody case might be something the Court
should see as justified based on historical practices standing separate and
apart from a marital relationship. That is, if the Court does rely on history and tradition to support such an expansion of Constitutional protection to some family ties, her research suggest it could do so even if it
abandons marriage as the central construct upon which all family-related
rights rest.
C.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDIES

These anthropological studies suggest that the Court's focus on historical Anglo kinship practices is too narrow to adequately delineate an ap333 See generally, GLOVER, supra note 2.
334 GLOVER, supra note 228, cover jacket summary.
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propriate set of Constitutional borders for legal protections of kinship
relations. Analysis of these accounts reveals a rich array of kinship practices, beliefs, and social meanings of those practices. This rich array
demonstrates a central problem with the Court's determination of tradition and its conclusions about the parameters of protected family structures. Although traditional heterosexual marriage is present in kinship
practices and beliefs of all of these cultural groups, marriage does not
necessarily always play the primary and central role in Americans' kinship structures as the Court sometimes states that it does in its kinship
cases. The marriage tie is sometimes subordinate or peripheral to other
bonds-whether mother/child (as in the Navajo tradition), or sibling ties
(as with South Carolina gentry), or the more generic parentichild tie suggested by Issei kinship structures. This suggests that if there is to be any
Constitutional protection of kinship ties based on historical and traditional practices, it needs to sweep more broadly than it does currently. It
is thus important to incorporate these kinds of studies into our understanding of protected marital and non-marital kinship structures, in order
that the protections are crafted in a way that maps onto actual kinship
practices.
CONCLUSION
The image that emerges from the studies discussed here is a multifaceted picture of cultural diversity in U.S. kinship practices, as well as
one of cultural forms that can and do change both in practice and in
meaning over time. Not only does this fleshed-out understanding of U.S.
kinship diverge from the narrow confines of statutory enactments, more
importantly, it demonstrates the problem with the Court's present determination of tradition, and consequently, its determination of which are
protected, as opposed to, unprotected, family structures. The Court's
static image of U.S. families simply does not account for the reality of
kinship practices. Further, Lorri Glover's study of Southern white gentry
suggests that even the Court's vision of the historical U.S. family as primarily marital, heterosexual, patriarchal, and nuclear is perhaps just
that-a vision. At a minimum, Glover's study demonstrates that it was
not the universal practice the Court professes it to be.
The purpose of evaluating these studies is not to suggest that the
Court should be required to ascertain the cultural or racial background of
the particular litigants in its kinship cases and then search out anthropological or sociological studies of that kinship group in order to reach an
appropriate decision. The suggestion, in other words, is not that the
Court's decisions should necessarily turn upon the cultural or racial
background of particular litigants. Rather, engaging these studies demonstrates several key points.
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First, these studies demonstrate the basic inaccuracy of the Court's
insistence in both dicta and in its substantive support for some of its
decisions that marriage forms the central fundamental relationship of
families in the United States. Second, these studies lend credence to Justice Brennan's claim that Justice Scalia's vision of family in Michael H.
is "cramped." Third, to the extent that the Court has insisted on focusing
on the marital relationship or "unitary family" as the source of other,
derivative rights such as the parent-child relationship or parenting rights
more generally, these studies suggest that the variety of kinship practices
and beliefs would support de-coupling these derivative rights from the
existence or non-existence of a marital bond.
Fourth and finally, to the extent that the Court's focus on the marital
family is indeed cramped, these studies raise questions about the source
of the Court's dicta and substantive empirical claims as to the centrality
of marriage in kinship practices in the United States. From the review of
the Court's cases in the prior section, the Justices-most notably the full
Court in Reynolds and Justice Scalia in Michael H.-do not appear to
consult or cite to empirical data in making their factual claims.
Had the Court had available or considered a study such as Schneider's study of white, urban, middle-class American families, it would at
least have been able to support its empirical claim about the centrality of
marriage with actual empirical evidence. Given the narrow group focus
of Schneider's study, however, the Court would then have to face headon why the norms and practices of that particular cultural group should
be entitled to protection while others should not, something it has yet to
justify in any of its cases that privilege these norms that happen to be
those of white middle-class Americans. Perhaps the answer to that
charge is simple: white, middle-class Americans still constitute the majority, and privileging those norms and practices is consistent with the
concept of giving Constitutional protection to practices rooted in tradition. To the extent that Justice Scalia, in particular, focuses his substantive due process analysis of tradition on legislative enactments-i.e.,
majority rule-privileging the actual practices of the majority would at
least be consistent.
That begs the deeper question, however, about why it is that majority rules (meaning statutes or social norms) should drive interpretation of
the Bill of Rights-a decidedly counter-majoritarian document. To the
extent that substantive due process rests on notions of fundamental rights
rooted in ordered liberty, however, the Court could instead extend protection to those practices that promote what Martha Nussbaum refers to
as "human flourishing." 335 Focusing on the functions served by various
335

Martha Nussbaum,

SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999).
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kin-ties and practices rather than on their formal form or status, would
support such an approach. As these studies demonstrate, the ways in
which different cultural groups in the United States choose to satisfy
those functions varies widely. Focusing on the basic functions of love,
support, and protection-"diffuse, enduring solidarity"-that underlie
human kinship ties would be consistent with the counter-majotitarian
values of the Bill of Rights and would loosen the cramped box into
which the Court has stuffed family-related rights to date.
The point of looking at these studies is not to claim that cultural
anthropology or sociology or some other disciplinary body of work is
necessarily the only or even best source of data for the Court in its kinship cases. However, since the question of tradition (and thus the substantive due process rubric more generally) is primarily descriptive rather
than normative, it is arguable that the Court should look not just to historical, juridical, and legislative pronouncements to determine the scope
of tradition, but also and perhaps originally, to these more nuanced descriptive accounts of actual kinship practices, as well as to the functions
served by those practices.
If the Court does shift from an emphasis on legal regulation to actual practices (of course with a more fleshed out understanding of those
practices), there, of course, arises a need for an analytical framework to
cabin the Court's analysis of Constitutional protection for families. 336 It
is possible that the analytical approach used by cultural anthropologists-focusing not just on social or cultural practices, but also on the
meanings of and functions served by those practices-might provide a
method of cabining the Court's substantive due process doctrine, while at
the same time providing for expanded protection for non-marital and
3 37
.
non-nuclear families.
To reach that conclusion, however, further investigation is required
on two fronts. As a preliminary matter, analysis of whether institutional
competence to investigate these kinds of studies rests more with the Con336 The contrary argument is that the only way to contain the Court's discretion is by
insisting that it need concern itself only with the superficial-i.e., the legal regulation-of
practices, regardless of the symbolic meaning of both those practices that are regulated as well
as those that are not. This is the approach preferred by Justice Scalia in Michael H. and Justice
Rehnquist in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 640 (1997). At times, the Court does engage the purposes and meaning of particular kinship practices such as parenting and marriage.
337 Further, extending the analysis to this deeper level would enable the Court to understand how kinship practices that appear to differ from cultural group to cultural group might in
fact substantively be the same, thus warranting the same legal treatment. In other words,
should the Court be faced with a minority group practice-one that the majority still saw fit to
deny legal protection to (thus not rising to the level of a changing trend, such as was the case
in Loving and Lawrence)-it could look to the functions served by that practice and determine
if they comported with the functions attributed to the kinship practices of the majority.
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338 Second, assumgress or with the Court would need to be undertaken.
ing the Court is an appropriate forum for consideration of sociological or
anthropological studies, a thorough investigation of whether cultural anthropology, sociology or some other disciplinary perspective or approach
would be the most appropriate one for the Court to consult in determining the scope of Constitutional protection for kinship relationships.
Consideration of the studies discussed in this Article exposes the
Court's claims about the nature of families in the U.S. as incomplete at
best. Even if the Court remains at a superficial level of evaluation and
understanding of kinship focusing upon statutory enactments, one need
only look at the variety of family structures revealed even using the
339
This data, at a
United States Census' narrow definition of family.

338 Some social science research has gotten the Supreme Court's attention from time to
time (albeit in a very limited fashion and highly sporadically). See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 394 U.S. 294, n. 11. The advent of the Brandeis Brief represents a specific moment
and method of bringing social science evidence to the Court's attention. See generally sources
cited supra note 31.
339 The United States Census, which determines not just voting rights, but forms the basis
for a number of fiscal decisions for federally funded benefits programs, uses a constrained
definition of family, limiting families to those who both legally or biologically adopted, but
also those who co-reside. See http://www.census.gov.population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last
visited July 2003) (defining a family as "a group of two or more people who reside together
and related by birth, marriage, or adoption"); see also KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, in
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS/POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (U.S. Dept. Of Commerce,

Economics and Statistics Administration ed., 1998).
The Census is not the only place where the Congress employs a narrow definition of family.
The Family and Medical Leave Act uses similarly constrained concepts of families. Lisa
Bomstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral
Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 110
(2000). "Unlike the ADA, which extends protection to persons who have a 'relationship' with
a person with a disability, the FMLA requires a 'recognized familial relationship' in order for
benefits to be extended." Id. The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 work
weeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a serious health condition of only a spouse,
child or parent. See Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972
(2003); see also Bomstein, supra at 84, 110-11 (noting that these limited relationship categories have been strictly construed). Though the FMLA does provide coverage for one who
stands in loco parentis to the child, this provision is aimed at the situation where one single
person is responsible for the ongoing care of the child, and thus excludes situations where a
child has multiple caregivers, or caregivers who are not legally or genetically related to the
child. See Bornstein, supra, at 11l.Definitions of "parent" and "spouse" are similarly restrictive. Id. at 111, 112-13. Further, care of one's in-laws is not covered by the Act, nor is care
for "relatives in extended or non-traditional families," including "relatives such as aunts, uncles, nieces, or nephews or biologically or legally unrelated family members with whom they
live. Id. at 11l.Even grandparents are excluded by the Act as both caregivers and as family
members who might need caretaking by the eligible employee. Id. at 112. "[Bly excluding
particular groups of individuals and family arrangements, the FMLA circumscribes the boundaries of appropriate family and gender roles, preserving a vision of family that is presumpI. at 104. The definition of
tively nuclear, heterosexual, middle-class, and male headed . " Id.
who constitutes an eligible employee and who constitutes a family member for whom the
eligible employee is entitled to take leave to care for (a parent, child, or spouse) thus denies the
FMLA benefit to those whose kinship and care-giving arrangements incorporate a broader
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minimum suggests that American kinship formations often now vary
widely from the traditional patriarchal nuclear family, and perhaps evi340
dence an expanding cultural variation in kinship in the United States.
A single cultural norm might be applicable for a homogeneous culture,
but not for one that is as originally and continuingly heterogeneous as is
the United States. 34' These changing demographics challenge us, and
the Court, to decide whether the true tradition and history and values of
our country are to allow space for multiple beliefs and practices, or
rather, that conformation to a single, static, monolithic model of kinship
behavior and belief best represents our tradition.

network of support, such as some urban African-American or recent immigrant communities.
Id. at 111-12. See also discussion of variations in kinship care giving at infra Part III.
340 See tables of populations and rankings from the 2000 U.S. Census, available at http://
uscensus.gov (last visited Aug 2003). The 2000 census information exhibits no differentiation
between different sub-cultural groups of Latinos of different cultural roots, nor among blacks
similarly with diverse cultural and historical backgrounds. Check: they are included in the
"Other"category.
341 See Meyer, Self-Definition, supra note 27, at 791-94 (discussing the emerging family
demonstrated by the new Census and questioning whether these changes should drive policy
change in terms of protecting family structures); Introduction: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 1999, 2001-2002 (2003) (describing the "empirical splendor" of the new Census' picture of American family).

